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PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS IN ANTITRUST LAW
JOHN M. NEWMAN*
The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows
defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive
effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly
numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.
But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and
scholars, this has remained an “open question,” even an “absolute mystery.”
Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and
seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is
inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning
antitrust enterprise.
This Article provides answers and clarity. It identifies the market failure approach
to analysis as doctrinally correct and economically optimal. The leading alternatives
pose an unacceptably high risk of error, in the form of both false positives and false
negatives. Most importantly, the Article identifies the proper, three-step method for
assessing procompetitive justifications. This three-step analytical framework
increases transparency and rigor, minimizes errors, and maximizes welfare.
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“That’s always been an absolute mystery to put to the class . . . .”
– Justice Stephen Breyer1
INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Reason has come to dominate antitrust law. 2 Over the past several
decades, courts have systematically retreated from bright-line rules condemning
various categories of marketplace conduct as per se illegal.3 The Rule of Reason, a
more searching mode of analysis, takes into account both harmful and beneficial
effects of defendants’ conduct.4 For decades, what qualifies as “harmful” has been
the subject of intense judicial and scholarly debate. 5 But what counts as “beneficial”?
Analyzing beneficial effects, or, in modern parlance, “procompetitive
justifications,” is a vital cornerstone of modern antitrust jurisprudence. But it is also
a topic that remains—particularly in light of its importance—rather shockingly

1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
(No. 16-1454).
2. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1500, at 388 (4th ed. 2017) (“Ever since [the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1911 Standard Oil decision], antitrust law has been governed
predominantly by a ‘rule of reason.’”). Analysts tend to use the term “rule of reason” to
describe Sherman Act § 1 proceedings, though the structural framework is similar to merger
and monopoly analyses. The present discussion generally confines itself to Sherman Act § 1,
but the implications offer value in merger and monopolization contexts as well. See generally
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (2012) (describing modern antitrust as “a
collection of ‘rules of reason’ that cut across [statutes] and serve as a set of unifying first
principles of antitrust law”).
3. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 2, at 734 (“The rule of reason has evolved considerably .
. . , largely due to the Court’s . . . march away from per se rules and undemanding burdens of
proof.”).
4. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (2016) (“The Rule of Reason . . . [is] a standard that balances pro- with
anticompetitive effects . . . .”). But see Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging
the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265 (finding that actual balancing is quite rare); D. Daniel
Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and
Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1008 (2014) (arguing that some types of vertical
restraints have effectively become per se legal).
5. Neither Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court have clearly articulated the goal(s) of
antitrust law, prompting a long-running academic debate. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel
Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 471, 473 (2012).
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underexplored. Justice Breyer’s “absolute mystery” quip was made in February
2018, some forty years after antitrust supposedly entered its “Modern Era.”6 Leading
scholars agree: “what constitutes an offsetting benefit to competition” remains a
“question left open.”7 An examination of the relevant case law reveals competing
approaches that have produced seemingly irreconcilable results. The resulting
confusion is such that different analysts can view the very same U.S. Supreme Court
decision as both a “conundrum”8 and also the “most elucidating”9 opinion on the
subject.
Meanwhile, modern antitrust defendants have continued to offer an everexpanding plethora of justifications for their conduct. In recent years, defendants
have attempted to avoid liability by arguing variously that their restraints of trade
created a “healthier market” by facilitating the launch of an online e-book platform, 10
preserved “amateurism” and promoted “competitive balance” in college sports, 11
promoted the “health and welfare” of horses,12 helped pay for “uniforms and newly
painted trucks,”13 integrated college academics and athletic programs, 14 responded
to an “inherently anticompetitive” government-agency action,15 increased access to
Ivy League colleges for financially needy students,16 promoted student-body
diversity,17 enhanced the defendant’s “market penetration,”18 helped to limit conflicts
of interest among employees,19 ensured the “undivided loyalty” of National Football
League team owners,20 helped to fund cemeteries’ task of resetting grave memorials
that “have settled or shifted,”21 and many more.
Defendants have even argued that two polar opposite effects were both
procompetitive. A hospital has argued that it needed to prevent one group of

6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454).
7. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, WARREN S. GRIMES & CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 5.3f, at 223 (3d ed. 2016).
8. Id.
9. Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 732 (2014).
10. United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 707–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 787 F.3d
131 (2015) (“Censuring Apple for entering a tumultuous new market, in Apple’s view, will
have a ‘chilling and confounding . . . effect not only on commerce but specifically on content
markets throughout this country.’ . . . It is not entirely clear to what Apple is alluding, however,
when it describes its pro-competitive behavior and creation of healthy competition.”).
11. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015).
12. JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., No. 8:02-CV-1585 T24MAP, 2005 WL
1126665, at *16 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005).
13. New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
14. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058.
15. United States v. N.D. Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (D.N.D. 1986).
16. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
17. Id.
18. Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp. 717 F.2d 1560, 1578 (11th Cir. 1983).
19. Pluekhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 749 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1985).
20. N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d Cir. 1982).
21. Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem’l Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1136 (8th
Cir. 1981).
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customers from subsidizing another group22—and a credit card company has argued
that it needed to force one group of customers to subsidize another group.23 In the
face of this chaos, and without clear guidance, judicial decision-making has
sometimes floundered.
This Article answers the open questions posed by procompetitive justifications. It
begins, in Part I, by identifying and describing the three primary competing
approaches to justification analysis. Under the “market failure” approach, a valid
justification is present if, and only if, the challenged restraint alleviates a market
failure, thereby increasing consumer welfare. 24 This inquiry is fundamentally
consequentialist; it reflects the focus on marketplace effects that is the hallmark of
antitrust law’s Modern Era. At the same time, it manages to avoid the unhealthy
obsession with particular types of effects—output and, to a lesser extent, price—that
too often dominate modern antitrust discourse.25
The two alternatives to the market-failure approach are the “competitive process”
and “type of effect” approaches. Both have been employed by (some) courts; both
have attracted a number of leading scholarly advocates and adherents. But, as this
Article demonstrates, both of these alternatives are out-of-step doctrinally—and for

22. United States v. N.D. Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (D.N.D. 1986).
23. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d,
838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
24. See infra Section I.B (detailing the doctrinal support for the market-failure approach).
This Article is not the first to argue that alleviating a market failure should qualify as a valid
procompetitive justification. See Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure
Defenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605 (1989) (arguing that
market failures may sometimes justify restraints in healthcare markets); Peter J. Hammer,
Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of
Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000) (arguing that restraints are
sometimes justified as “intramarket second-best tradeoffs”); Marina Lao, Discrediting
Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035, 1083 (2002) (arguing
that accreditation decisions may be justified by virtue of curing certain market failures,
specifically information asymmetries and externalities); Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or
Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO.
L.J. 835, 849–50 (2016) (arguing that “technological efficiencies or overcoming a market
failure” can trigger rule-of-reason analysis). This Article expands upon past commentary by
more clearly identifying and explaining the alternative approaches to procompetitivejustification analysis, making an explicitly doctrinal case for the market-failure approach, and
incorporating the Neo-Chicagoan error-cost framework into a normative, consequentialist
argument in favor of the market-failure approach. On error-cost analysis and antitrust, see
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
25. The modern consensus is that antitrust should seek to maximize the economic
conception of consumer welfare. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 889–90 (citing with approval the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889
(2007) (No. 06-480) (arguing in favor of relaxing the per se illegality rule against vertical
minimum resale-price maintenance on the grounds that such arrangements “may promote
interbrand competition and consumer welfare in a variety of ways”)); Blair & Sokol, supra
note 5. The present discussion proceeds under that assumption, without weighing in on
whether it is, in fact, correct.
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good reason, since both produce unnecessarily high risks of erroneous decisionmaking.
Part II undertakes a doctrinal analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s major
procompetitive-justification decisions. It identifies some surprisingly early support
for the market-failure approach in Justice Brandeis’s seminal Chicago Board of
Trade opinion.26 For a brief span of about two decades stretching from 1958 to 1977,
however, the Court focused instead on the vague concepts of “competition itself” and
the “competitive process.”27 But after this brief dalliance, the Court returned to the
market-failure approach, which it has employed ever since. 28
Part II concludes by exploring the normative implications of this doctrinal
analysis for “non-welfare justifications.” What, for example, is a lower court to make
of a defendant’s claim that its restraint was necessary to promote horses’ health 29 or
increase access to Ivy League education? 30 As a doctrinal matter, such justifications
may be considered at a preliminary stage of analysis: they may indicate that a
defendant’s conduct was truly “noncommercial” and therefore outside the scope of
the antitrust laws. But these are not cognizable procompetitive justifications. The
scattered judicial decisions recognizing them as such do so erroneously, eroding the
value offered by a coherent, workable, and predictable body of antitrust rules.
Part III undertakes an error-cost analysis of the three leading approaches: market
failure, competitive process, and type of effect. Of the three, the market-failure
approach offers the clearest guidance to stakeholders. It also helpfully (re)focuses
antitrust on its consensus goal of promoting consumer welfare. The competitiveprocess and type-of-effect approaches, on the other hand, tend to produce
uncertainty, imprecision, and excessive errors.
Building on these insights, Part IV explains how best to analyze procompetitive
justifications. The market-failure approach, when employed properly, entails three
distinct steps. First, a defendant must identify some specific market failure. Second,
the defendant must demonstrate that, absent the challenged restraint, the relevant
market actually exhibited (or would have exhibited) the alleged failure. Third, the
defendant must show that its restraint actually alleviated the market failure.
As Part IV demonstrates via a real-world case comparison, this three-step
framework can help to reduce confusion, increase judicial efficiency, and filter out
baseless justifications.31 The market-failure approach itself is doctrinally correct and
economically optimal. But if it is applied without rigor, it will fail to serve its
intended purpose. With the means and ends of modern antitrust enforcement coming
under ever-increasing criticism,32 the task at hand is of utmost importance to the
continuing legitimacy of the antitrust enterprise.

26. See infra Section II.A.
27. See infra Section II.B.
28. See infra Section II.C.
29. JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., No. 8:02-CV-1585 T24MAP, 2005 WL
1126665 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005).
30. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
31. See infra Part IV.B (comparing and contrasting United States v. Am. Express Co., 88
F. Supp. 3d 143, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), with SCFC ILC,
Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 964 (10th Cir. 1994)).
32. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, How Democrats Can Wage War on Monopolies—and Win,
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I. PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS: COMPETING APPROACHES
There is general consensus as to the structure of modern Rule of Reason analysis,
within which procompetitive justifications (or the lack thereof) come into play at two
distinct stages.33 But, despite their prominent role in antitrust enforcement,
procompetitive justifications have remained underexplored and poorly understood.
At best they pose an “open question”; 34 at worst they represent an “absolute
mystery.”35
As an initial, and uncontroversial, matter, not all restraints of trade are condemned
by antitrust law. The leading treatise rightly points out that “[i]t is obviously not the
purpose of the antitrust laws to condemn collaborations producing socially desirable
results.”36 At a high level, the task of antitrust tribunals and enforcers is to distinguish
anticompetitive (“unreasonable”) restraints from procompetitive or neutral
(“reasonable”) restraints.37 Only the former are to be condemned under the antitrust
laws.
Procompetitive justifications play a two-fold role in this analysis.38 First, courts
confronting claims under Sherman Act § 1 must decide whether to apply the per se
illegality rule or the rule of reason. If the challenged conduct is treated as per se
illegal, the plaintiff need not define a relevant market, prove that the defendant has

NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144675/democrats
-elizabeth-warren-can-wage-war-monopolies-and-win
[https://perma.cc/2KRV-2APQ]
(“Reformers argue that . . . even increased enforcement under the existing legal paradigm
would be inadequate because the consumer welfare standard is too narrowly drawn to
effectively mitigate the harms of consolidation in the modern age.”); David Dayen, The
Rehabilitation
of
Antitrust,
AM.
PROSPECT
(Dec.
22,
2017),
http://prospect.org/article/rehabilitation-antitrust [https://perma.cc/3WRC-7TKP] (describing
an “extraordinary hearing” held by the Senate Judiciary Committee over whether the consumer
welfare standard remains appropriate); David McLaughlin, Forget Consumer Welfare. This
Antitrust Movement Targets Power Instead, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2018, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/forget-consumer-welfare-thisantitrust-movement-targets-power-instead [https://perma.cc/4V53-AF6U] (“Today, with
mounting evidence of increased concentration and declining competition across the economy,
a small group of policy wonks is mounting an attack on corporate consolidation. . . . Their
criticism is sparking fresh debate in Washington and some soul-searching in the insular, nerdy
world of competition policy.”).
33. That said, even here there is some disagreement—the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, has suggested that the analytical framework does not rise even to the level of a
“spectrum.” Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999).
34. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 7.
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
(No. 16-1454).
36. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1504, at 414.
37. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 2, at 735 (“The various frameworks of the new rules of
reason are all animated by a common purpose: to differentiate anticompetitive from efficient
conduct.”).
38. For ease of discussion, this Article refers only to per se treatment and the full-scale
rule of reason. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, however, “our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason.’”
Cal. Dental Ass’n., 526 U.S. at 779.
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market power, or demonstrate actual harmful effects. 39 Moreover, the defendant
cannot offer offsetting procompetitive justifications. 40 The fact of the conduct alone
triggers liability.
The rule of reason (what the leading treatise calls “full-scale rule of reason”)41 is
far less friendly to plaintiffs.42 Under this rule, the plaintiff must prove actual or likely
effects, market power, or both.43 If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant gets a chance
to prove offsetting procompetitive justifications. 44 If the defendant does so, “the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies
could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.”45
Thus, this initial choice between per se illegality and the rule of reason is of utmost
practical importance. But how is the choice to be made? Courts, enforcers, and
commentators often invoke a categorical approach based on the type of conduct at
issue.46 For example, one often encounters statements to the effect that “horizontal
price fixing is per se illegal.”47 But that is not always true. In the seminal BMI case,
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to a joint-licensing
arrangement that involved horizontal price fixing because of the agreement’s obvious

39. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)
(“[A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the [Sherman] Act though no overt act is shown,
though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for accomplishment
of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign
commerce in the commodity.”).
40. See id. (“Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be
thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness.”).
41. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1504, at 414.
42. Empirical analysis suggests that the rule of reason—as it is currently applied—is
essentially fatal to plaintiffs’ claims. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (finding that,
over a ten-year period, defendants won 221 of 222 reported rule of reason cases). At least in
litigation scenarios, the modern rule of reason is quite close to becoming a per se legality rule.
43. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“[T]he plaintiff has
the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect
that harms consumers in the relevant market.”).
44. See id. (“If the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to
show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.”).
45. Id. Other courts have stated that the final step requires the court to balance pro- against
anticompetitive effects. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (identifying balancing as the final step of analysis).
46. This was so particularly during the Inhospitality Era. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 2, at
736 (“[T]he[] modern rule[] of reason also tend[s] to rely far less on the traditional approach
of ‘categorization’ followed by condemnation or exoneration. For at least fifty years, from
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. to Sylvania, the Supreme Court developed a sorting
framework that separated antitrust cases into categories based on the nature of the conduct and
two distinct rules: per se and rule of reason.”). That said, this approach still manifests with
some frequency today. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Identifying Sherman Act Violations, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, U.S. DOJ,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/antitrust-resource-manual-2-antitrust-division-field-offices
[https://perma.cc/CFC7-ZQL7].
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beneficial effects.48 Other courts have similarly applied the rule of reason to
categories of conduct often spoken of as being per se illegal.49
As these cases indicate, it is often the presence or absence of plausible
procompetitive justifications—not the category of conduct at issue—that drives the
choice between the per se rule and the full-scale rule of reason. This is the first
function played by procompetitive justifications: courts take an initial glance 50 at the
challenged restraint, ascertain its plausible competitive effects, and decide which rule
to apply.51 This initial glance can be usefully thought of as “step zero” of the
analysis.52 At this stage, the procompetitive-justifications inquiry operates purely as
a sorting mechanism.53
The second function played by procompetitive justifications (or lack thereof)
comes into play if the restraint receives full-scale rule of reason analysis, and the
plaintiff successfully makes out its prima facie case. Under such circumstances,
defendants may proffer procompetitive justifications as a responsive defense. 54 In a
given case, the plaintiff can carry its initial burden by alleging and proving that the
challenged conduct “is of a type reasonably calculated to have,” 55 or actually has,56
anticompetitive effects. Should the plaintiff do so, the burden of production 57 shifts
to the defendant to identify a valid procompetitive justification for its restraint. 58

48. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying the rule of reason to horizontal price-fixing of wages);
Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding a uniform
interchange fee set by an association of credit card-issuing banks).
49. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(horizontal product-market allocation); United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., No.
2:16CR403 DS, 2017 WL 3720695 (D. Utah Aug. 28, 2017) (horizontal customer allocation),
rev’d on other grounds, No. 17-4148, 2018 WL 5623925 (10th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018).
50. One hesitates to use the term “quick look,” given its unique connotations in the
antitrust arena. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1508, at 455 (“This treatise has
generally avoided using the term ‘quick look’ unless quoting from decisions, because it
suggests a tripartite division [“rule of reason,” “quick look,” and “per se”] that does not
account for the full range of variations that the cases display.”).
51. Thus, even the nominal per se rule allows consideration of legitimate justifications
that, if found, trigger a full-scale rule of reason inquiry. Id. ¶ 1504e, at 427.
52. See Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 709, 725 (2018).
53. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (employing
a burden-shifting analysis under both Sherman Act § 1 and § 2, identifying balancing as the
final step of analysis).
55. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1504b, at 415.
56. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58–
59.
57. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 77, 108.
58. Despite some doctrinal confusion, most authorities agree that if the defendant
establishes a procompetitive justification, the next stage entails examining whether lessrestrictive means were available. C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust
Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 938 n.49 (2016) (collecting cases). Absent such an alternative,
the majority view is that courts will balance the anticompetitive effects against the
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The following discussion identifies and describes the three leading alternative
approaches to assessing procompetitive justifications at these two stages of antitrust
analysis. Each approach has been used at various times, and with varying degrees of
success, by antitrust courts and enforcers.59
A. Market Failure
At a high level, the market-failure approach asks whether a defendant’s conduct
alleviated a failure, or inefficiency, of the relevant market. As this Article will
demonstrate, the market-failure approach is doctrinally correct and produces superior
outcomes with lower attendant error costs relative to the alternative approaches. To
set the groundwork, a brief primer on the workings and underlying economics of the
market-failure approach follows.
Because analyzing all of the interactions in an economy (“general equilibrium
analysis”) is not practical, antitrust analysts instead employ “partial equilibrium
analysis.”60 This methodology entails defining and analyzing a single market—the
“relevant market”61—in isolation, holding constant competitive conditions in all
other markets.62
A market failure occurs when the relevant market produces outcomes that are less
efficient than they might be.63 As employed in antitrust law and economics,

procompetitive effects. E.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58–59; Carrier, supra note 4.
59. The literature identifies additional approaches that have not met with as much
acceptance from courts and enforcers. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton, Efficiencies and Antitrust
Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 168 (2015) (identifying the
redundancy and antifragility of small units relative to large ones as a type of efficiency).
60. See, e.g., Hammer, supra note 24, at 853–56.
61. “Relevant market” is a term of art in antitrust, the legal significance of which can be,
in a given case, somewhat murky. In some cases—for example, those involving hardcore
horizontal price fixing without any plausible procompetitive justifications—plaintiffs are not
required to prove that the defendants possessed market power, which usually requires first
defining a “relevant market.” See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 437, 438–39 (2010) (noting that market definition plays a “roughly similar”
role in competition law regimes outside the United States). But in many—perhaps most—civil
antitrust cases, market definition plays a pivotal role. See id. at 439 (citing Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992) (“Because market power
is often inferred from market share, market definition generally determines the result of the
case.”)).
62. Hammer, supra note 24, at 856.
63. See generally, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 122 (1990) (referring to “distortions” like externalities as “market
failures”); Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958)
(“What is it we mean by ‘market failure’? Typically, . . . we mean the failure of a more or less
idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain ‘desirable’ activities or to estop
‘undesirable’ activities.”). The law and economics literature postdating the Great Recession
offers relatively nuanced discussion of market failure. See, e.g., Robert A. Brown, Financial
Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors’ Ignorance in Securitization Markets,
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 105, 145 (2010) (“The term market failure is a term of art in economics.
. . . [E]conomists frequently disagree about the definition of the term . . . .”); Gabriel
Rauterberg, The Corporation’s Place in Society, 114 MICH. L. REV. 913, 914–15 (2016)
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“efficiency” generally refers to “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency.64 A change is KaldorHicks efficient if those made better off thereby could compensate (out of their gains)
any left worse off.65 How are terms like “better” and “worse” defined? In this context,
they relate to “welfare,” a sometimes frustratingly vague signifier properly
synonymous with the price-theoretic concept of “surplus,” 66 the difference between
what a buyer (or seller) would have been willing to pay (or accept) and what that
buyer actually paid (or accepted).67 More specifically, then, an antitrust market
failure occurs where the relevant market could better promote surplus.
But whose surplus? An academic debate still lingers over which market
participants’ surplus is relevant to antitrust analysis. Proponents of a total- or socialwelfare standard contend that both producer and consumer surplus are relevant,
whereas consumer welfare advocates focus solely on consumer surplus. 68 In practice,
courts seem to prefer a consumer welfare standard,69 suggesting that only restraints
of trade that increase consumer surplus are potentially justified. If a restraint
increases a monopolist’s surplus but decreases consumer surplus, it will likely be
condemned—even if the monopolist’s gain from the restraint is so large that it could
have hypothetically compensated consumers’ losses.
Where a market fails to maximize consumer welfare as well as it otherwise might,
it is—in the argot of antitrust courts—not “efficient.”70 It has become commonplace

(defining “market failure” as occurring “when the allocation of goods and services in a market
is inefficient for some reason”); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow
Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 15
(2014) (identifying five “general categories of market failures,” including information failure,
agency failure, externalities, noncompetitive markets, and public goods problems). Although,
as Brown suggests, there is no small amount of disagreement on what constitutes a “market
failure,” the term is generally understood to denote something less severe than a layperson
might assume—a total failure or absence of market activity. See Brown, supra, at 145. Instead,
it commonly denotes a market that is operating “inefficiently” relative to some normatively
desired benchmark. Id. And in the case of antitrust, the modern consensus favors a standard
economic conception of “consumer welfare” as the appropriate benchmark.
64. On Kaldor-Hicks versus Pareto optimality, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12–13 (7th ed. 2007) (“[W]hen an economist says that free trade
or competition or the control of pollution or some other policy or state of the world is efficient,
nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient.”).
65. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.3, at 101 (5th ed. 2016).
66. Hammer, supra note 24, at 891–95 (discussing consumer surplus and its relationship
to total welfare).
67. Id. at 891.
68. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 15 (2015).
69. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2471, 2476 (2013).
70. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902
(2007). The Leegin majority, assessing whether to overrule the decades-old per se prohibition
on minimum resale price maintenance (RPM), noted that some alternative strategies could
allow a manufacturer to attain the same “procompetitive benefits” as minimum RPM. Yet, per
the majority, those strategies “could be less efficient” (emphasis added)—thus, forcing firms
to adopt them “hinders competition and consumer welfare because manufacturers are forced
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to speak of “efficiency” as if it were an end unto itself. 71 But efficiency is
meaningless in a vacuum: “efficient” at doing what? In modern antitrust discourse,
analysts most often mean efficient at promoting consumer welfare. Thus, judicial
references to “efficiency” are best understood vis-à-vis a market’s impact, beneficial
or detrimental, on consumer welfare.
Some restraints of trade imposed by private market participants can improve the
relevant market’s performance, yielding more efficient outcomes. 72 In other words,
such restraints alleviate a market failure. This concept is the cornerstone of the
market-failure approach to procompetitive-justification analysis. Where a restraint
of trade alleviates a market failure, it is “efficient” (in the unique, consumer-focused
sense in which modern antitrust courts use that term) and therefore potentially
justified.
How are courts and enforcers to identify market failures? Modern antitrust law
draws from partial-equilibrium price theory,73 transaction-cost economics,74 game
theory,75 and even behavioral economics.76 It offers, in other words, something for
everyone to criticize. The use of price theory’s idealized 77 “perfect competition”
model is no exception, having drawn rather intense criticism for its lack of
descriptive accuracy, as well as its blindness to certain types of market failure and
the procompetitive potential of nonstandard contracts.78 That said, the perfectcompetition model offers value in the present context: it can help to identify some
common sources of market failure and to explain a great deal of the relevant case
law.79

to engage in second-best alternatives and because consumers are required to shoulder the
increased expense.” Id. The Court, in other words, used the ideas of “efficiency” and
“consumer welfare” interchangeably, suggesting that consumer welfare is the proper metric
by which to assess the efficiency (or inefficiency) of a given instance of challenged conduct.
71. See, e.g., Jenefer Curtis, Efficiency Takes a Beating, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 15, 2001),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/efficiency-takes-a-beating/article764764
[https://
perma.cc/CWK5-EFWV] (last updated Apr. 13, 2018) (reviewing JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE
CULT OF EFFICIENCY (2002)).
72. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 902.
73. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 57, at 120 (describing the incorporation of price-theoretic
models into antitrust law and economics).
74. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974).
75. E.g., Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d
Cir. 1993) (“Game theory teaches us that a cartel cannot survive absent some enforcement
mechanism because otherwise the incentives to cheat are too great.”).
76. See Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral Economics and U.S. Antitrust Policy, 47 REV.
IND. ORG. 355 (2015) (collecting and describing instances of U.S. antitrust courts relaxing the
assumption of perfect rationality).
77. Or, as Meese wryly puts it, “antiseptic.” Meese, supra note 57, at 120.
78. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of
Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 21, 22 (2005).
79. Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 60
(1993) (“[A]ntitrust must use the model [of perfect competition] and its implications as a guide
to reasoning about actual markets . . . .”).
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Perfect competition is a partial-equilibrium model.80 How closely a given market
approximates a state of perfect competition depends on several conditions. 81
Deviations from at least some of these conditions tend to decrease the relevant
market’s efficiency. Most relevant for present purposes are the conditions of perfect
information,82 lack of market power,83 zero transaction costs,84 lack of externalities,85
and rational behavior by market participants. 86 Markets can also fail where
individually welfare-maximizing actions, when taken by a group of individuals, have
the paradoxical effect of leaving everyone worse off. 87
To illustrate how a deviation from the idealized state of perfect competition can
cause a market to perform less efficiently, consider the presence of high transaction
costs. Such costs can make a given exchange unprofitable for sellers and/or buyers. 88
Surplus-maximizing actors will not enter into such an exchange, even where it
would, absent transaction costs, make both parties better off. 89 The presence of high
transaction costs has caused a market failure: the market will perform less efficiently
than it would absent such costs.90 Certain restraints of trade can reduce transaction
costs, facilitating mutually beneficial exchanges and increasing efficiency. 91 The
market-failure approach recognizes such restraints as (at least potentially) justified. 92

80. See Hammer, supra note 24, at 855–56.
81. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 51–93 (1921)
(listing requisite conditions for perfect competition).
82. Meese, supra note 57, at 116.
83. See KNIGHT, supra note 81.
84. Id. at 116–17.
85. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 244
(1985).
86. E.g., John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513 (2018).
87. See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
162, 179 (2013).
88. For an accessible definition of “transaction costs,” see David M. Driesen & Shubha
Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a
World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 62 (2005) (“One can best understand transaction costs
by contrasting them with production and purchase costs. Thus, for example, when a widget
maker enters into a contract to supply a customer with widgets, neither the production costs
incurred in manufacturing the widgets nor the money the customer pays to purchase the
widgets, constitute transaction costs. But the money both sides expend in negotiating and
enforcing the supply contract constitutes a transaction cost.”).
89. Meese usefully distinguishes between “technological” transaction costs, defined as
“bargaining and information costs that generally precede a transaction,” and “nontechnological transaction costs,” which “postdate relationship-specific investments that
enhance product differentiation.” Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific
Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
457, 459 (2010). This Article recognizes both types as cognizable causes of structural market
failures.
90. See generally 2 KENNETH J. ARROW, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 134 (1983) (describing
“transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular cases completely block the
formation of markets”).
91. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 699, 723–26 (1977) (merger context).
92. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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It bears emphasizing that not all of the conditions requisite for the economic
model of perfect competition will necessarily promote efficiency in a given realworld market. For example, the model assumes rising average total costs. 93 Such
markets are best served by many small sellers. But in a market where average cost
declines throughout some relevant range of output, production is subject to
economies of scale.94 In markets with scale economies, the presence of many
sellers—each with a higher-than-necessary cost structure—is likely inefficient.95 A
restraint of trade that “alleviates” market concentration caused by economies of scale
does not necessarily increase, and may very well decrease, efficiency. As a result,
the market-failure approach would not recognize such restraints as justified.
In sum, the market-failure approach to procompetitive-justification analysis
recognizes that restraints of trade can sometimes improve the functioning of markets.
Where a restraint alleviates a market failure, thereby increasing that market’s
efficiency, it is potentially justified. As this Article will demonstrate, this approach
fits comfortably within the consensus framework for rule-of-reason analysis and
antitrust law at large.96 It also produces more accurate decisions, with lower attendant
error costs, than either of the two alternatives discussed below.
B. Competitive Process
The competitive-process approach purports to distinguish between pro- and
anticompetitive restraints via their effects not on welfare or efficiency, but on
“competition itself” or on the “competitive process.” In other words, if a challenged
restraint somehow benefits the competitive process, the defendant may avoid
antitrust liability. Multiple antitrust scholars argue that “competitive process” is the

93. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of
Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 575–76 (1947).
94. Horton provocatively suggests that such economies may be offset by a different kind
of “efficiency,” the antifragility of a collection of small units as compared to a single large
unit. Horton, supra note 59, at 185.
95. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 693 (2010) (“Adherents to ‘workable competition’ . . .
recognize[ed] that certain departures from perfect competition could actually generate more
benefits than harms, despite resulting market power. The classic example was economies of
scale . . . .”).
96. See infra Part II.
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prevailing and appropriate approach.97 Others, while conceding that it has fallen out
of favor, nonetheless call for its resurrection. 98
But the actual content of the competitive-process approach remains mercurial, a
cipher. The scholarly arguments in favor of it never seem to identify what, exactly,
constitutes the “competitive process.” More than a half-century has passed since the
Court first clearly invoked the competitive process approach to condemn a restraint
of trade, yet terms like “competition” and “competitive process” are still
“wonderfully ill-defined.”99
Whatever the competitive process may be, it apparently can be harmed. A plaintiff
carries its initial burden by showing such harm.100 If (or, perhaps more accurately,
when) the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
some offsetting benefit.101 If it is unclear what constitutes harm to the competitive
process, it is even less clear what might qualify as a benefit. But, at least in theory, a
defendant who succeeds in proving such a benefit may escape liability.102
A permissible reading of the relevant precedent suggests that the overriding
concern does not lie with marketplace effects, placing this approach at loggerheads
with the rest of modern antitrust law. 103 Instead, the competitive-process approach
derives from a group of rather vaguely defined rights. These include, but are not
limited to, the right of a “single merchant” to compel a “group of powerful
businessmen” to supply him with “the goods he needs to compete effectively,” 104 the

97. E.g., Werden, supra note 9; see also Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2256 (2013). Here and elsewhere, Orbach offers a convincing
argument to the effect that the “consumer welfare” standard does not offer as much clarity as
its proponents generally assume. While that may be so, it does not follow that the “competitive
process” (or “competition”) standard fares any better. In fact, the latter standard appears to
offer even less clarity—unless it means simply that defendants always lose, in which case it
offers a great deal of clarity but also (likely) an overly high likelihood of false positives.
Orbach’s historical account concludes that “competition” was the sole standard for the roughly
seven decades between the passage of the Sherman Act and the release of Bork’s The Antitrust
Paradox. Orbach, supra, at 2277. This account does not, however, discuss Chicago Board of
Trade.
98. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S.
Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2017.
99. Hammer, supra note 24, at 850 n.3.
100. If the Supreme Court ever applied (or blessed the application of) the full-scale rule of
reason during the Competitive Process Era, this author is not aware of it. That said, one can
infer that the plaintiff bore such an initial burden from the Court’s per se jurisprudence. See,
e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (“[T]he essential prerequisites for
treating the defendant’s tying arrangements as unreasonable ‘per se’ were conclusively
established below . . . .”). Despite the Court’s usage of the passive voice in the quoted passage,
it seems clear that the only actor who could have done the “establish[ing] below” was the
plaintiff. Id.
101. Cf. id. (“[T]he defendant has offered to prove nothing there or here which would alter
this conclusion.”).
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, “The Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” Really?, 99 IOWA
L. REV. BULL. 17, 23 (2013) (“Antitrust is . . . best understood as a consequentialist body of
law designed to maximize economic efficiency and consumer welfare.”).
104. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (applying the per se
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“right” of traders to be “free” from various nonstandard contractual provisions, 105
and a more general right of “freedom of action.”106
Given the lack of clarity in the area, one is left free (or, less charitably, forced) to
speculate as to the source and content of these rights. Perhaps they derive from
Lochnerian freedom of contract. Certain early U.S. Supreme Court antitrust
decisions—which happen to lie squarely in the heart of the Lochner Era—do speak
of antitrust-related “rights.” Thus, for example, the Court in 1914 identified a single
retailer’s “unquestioned right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient
to himself.”107 But by 1945, after the end of the Lochner Era,108 the Court was
retreating from that hardline stance, referring to it as “true” only “in a very general
sense.”109
Whatever their source, the rights that seem to underlie the competitive-process
approach had the practical effect of rendering a great many agreements invalid under
the antitrust laws. Application of the competitive-process approach rarely, if ever,
identifies any procompetitive justifications. During the 1960s and early 1970s, when
this approach was en vogue, nearly every restraint was treated as harmful to the

illegality rule to a thinly alleged “conspiracy” among multinational electronics manufacturers
to refuse to deal with an independent retailer).
105. These include exclusive-territory restrictions, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (“[T]he Sherman Act gives to each Topco member and to each
prospective member the right to ascertain for itself whether or not competition with other
supermarket chains is more desirable than competition in the sale of Topco brand products.”);
group boycotts, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941)
(“[A]mong the many respects in which the Guild’s plan runs contrary to the policy of the
Sherman Act are these: it narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers can
sell and the sources from which retailers can buy . . . [and] subjects all retailers and
manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild’s program to an organized boycott . . .
.”); etc.
106. Fashion Originators, 312 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he Guild’s plan . . . takes away the freedom
of action of members by requiring each to reveal to the Guild the intimate details of their
individual affairs . . . .”).
107. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
108. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Adkins v.
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
109. Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945). At least arguably, the Court
subsequently lurched back toward this attitude. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or
refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.”); see also Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“[A]s a
general matter, the Sherman Act does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original))). But even
these cases refer only to a “general” right, rather than the “unquestioned” right identified in
Eastern States, 234 U.S. at 614.
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“competitive process,” usually under the strict rule of per se illegality.110 Not much
more than simple, one-off contracts escaped liability. 111
C. Type of Effect
Some courts and enforcers instead attempt justification analysis using a typology
of pre-approved marketplace effects. The inquiry comprises two steps. First, the
analyst must assemble a checklist of effects that constitute valid procompetitive
justifications. The typical list approves of restraints that “reduce cost, increase output
or improve product quality, service, or innovation.” 112 Second, the analyst simply
ascertains whether the challenged restraint causes any of the effects on that list. 113
Under the type-of-effect approach, a restraint that increases output, lowers price,
etc., is justified (“reasonable”) regardless of the reason it causes that effect. A
restraint that decreases output, increases price, etc., is unjustified (“unreasonable”),
again regardless of why it does so.
To illustrate, consider Law v. NCAA, in which the Tenth Circuit employed this
approach to analyze a horizontal agreement capping coaches’ salaries.114 After noting
the cap’s obvious anticompetitive effects, the court identified a checklist of valid
procompetitive effects: “increasing output, creating operating efficiencies, making a
new product available, enhancing product or service quality, and widening consumer
choice.”115 The court also identified “mere profitability or cost savings” as effects
that cannot justify restraints.116 Since the NCAA’s proffered justification (“cost
containment”) was not on the “valid” list, and was in fact on the “invalid” list, the
court rejected it.117
An extreme version of the type-of-effect approach focuses exclusively on output
effects. This simplistic approach seeks to cabin all of antitrust analysis to a mere
output inquiry. If a challenged restraint decreases output, it is always unreasonable.
If it increases output, it is always reasonable. 118 Leading scholars and jurists,
particularly Robert Bork, advocate adoption of this output-only variant.119

110. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 9, at 729 (“Northern Pacific began an era during which
the Supreme Court saw a ‘pernicious effect’ in every restraint it examined.”).
111. See id.
112. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting approvingly the
FTC’s decision in McWane, Inc., 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 78,670, 2014 WL 556261 (FTC
Jan. 30, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113. This categorical approach has been described, during personal conversations, by a
number of antitrust practitioners and scholars as a “lawyerly” approach—it appeals to the
lawyerly instinct toward simplifying typologies.
114. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 1023.
116. Id. (“[M]ere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a defense under the
antitrust laws.”).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7.03[A] (3d ed. 2017) (“Fundamentally, the rule
of reason considers whether a restraint is output increasing or output decreasing.”).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
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Sophisticated proponents of this approach generally appear to agree that
maximizing some form of welfare—not maximizing output per se—is the
overarching goal of antitrust.120 Thus, the output-only variant can be understood as
heuristic in nature. If conduct that increases output virtually always increase
consumer welfare, then output effects could perhaps be used as a shortcut to simplify
the judicial task.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Bork’s attempt to craft a shortcut would
(somewhat ironically) create an antitrust paradox: a legal regime that harms that
which it ostensibly protects. Actual output effects are often difficult, if not
impossible, to assess in a given case, even where harm to consumer welfare has
clearly occurred. Yet the output-only approach would overlook—and therefore
implicitly bless—such harm. Moreover, conduct that increases output does not
always increase—and may, in fact, decrease—consumer welfare.121 Here again, an
output-only approach would overlook harm to welfare. Finally, antitrust courts are
often confronted with claims that focus on other aspects of competition: a given case
may hinge on quality, innovation, etc.122 The output-only shortcut offers no guidance
in such cases.123 Thus, the discussion that follows will focus on the type-of-effect
approach as it is actually employed, rather than the more extreme output-only variant.
II. DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR THE MARKET-FAILURE APPROACH
Antitrust doctrine generally supports the view that a restraint is procompetitive
if—but only if—it alleviates a market failure. On its face, Sherman Act § 1 condemns
“[e]very . . . restraint of trade.”124 That phrase invoked a well-established common
law doctrine disfavoring contractual noncompete provisions. 125 Initially, all such
provisions were held to be against public policy and therefore invalid. 126 But,
recognizing the opportunity to facilitate welfare-enhancing investments and
transactions, courts relaxed the doctrine to prohibit only “unreasonable” noncompete
agreements. Under this standard, such agreements were “reasonable” (and

(No. 16-1454) (question by Justice Gorsuch); BORK, supra note 79, at 122 (1993) (“The task
of antitrust is to identify and prohibit those forms of behavior whose net effect is output
restricting and hence detrimental.”).
120. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 79 (arguing for a total welfare standard, which Bork
referred to as “consumer welfare”).
121. See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing
Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–6 (1997) (“[C]oercion and deception can
also increase demand and output, yet may injure consumers.”); infra note 165 and
accompanying text (noting that externalizing costs tends to inefficiently increase output).
122. E.g., Allensworth, supra note 4.
123. Unless, that is, “output” is a synecdoche for these other aspects of competition, in
which case the output-only variant adds nothing of value relative to the broader type-of-effect
approach.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
125. Cf. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897)
(construing the Sherman Act’s prohibition of “restraints of trade,” recognizing that
“[c]ontracts in restraint of trade have been known and spoken of for hundreds of years, both
in England and in this country”).
126. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911).
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enforceable) so long as they were no broader than necessary to “protect the legitimate
commercial interests of the party seeking protection.”127 This consequentialist mode
of analysis provided a groundwork upon which nascent antitrust laws would build.
After some early uncertainty, 128 the U.S. Supreme Court quickly concluded that
Sherman Act § 1, like its common law antecedent, condemns only unreasonable
restraints of trade.129 Since all contracts “restrain trade” to some degree, a literal
reading of the statute would have been untenable. 130 In its seminal Standard Oil
opinion in 1911, the Court pronounced that “the standard of reason which had been
applied at the common law . . . was intended to be the measure used” in applying the
Sherman Act.131 Thus, antitrust courts’ primary task under Sherman Act § 1 became
deciding which agreements “in restraint of trade” are unjustified and unreasonable,
and which are justified and reasonable.
A. Early Support
Seven years after Standard Oil, Justice Brandeis’s Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) opinion set forth the classic formulation of the rule of reason: “The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, all are relevant facts.” 132 Though
sometimes criticized as overbroad,133 Brandeis’s articulation highlights a useful
point: left unrestrained in a literal sense, markets may fail to produce optimal results,
i.e., cause “evil.” What looks like a harmful restraint of trade may, in fact, be a
“remedy” for undesirable results. 134
Though Brandeis wrote at a time before the modern economic concept of market
failure had crystallized,135 his CBOT opinion invoked its underlying tenets. The
challenged conduct—a rule freezing the price of grain during after-hours trading—
was unquestionably a “restraint” of trade, specifically price competition. Yet the
CBOT Court was hospitable to a number of the defendant’s procompetitive
justifications because, as Brandeis put it, the restraint “helped to improve market

127. See David Cabrelli & Louise Floyd, New Light Through Old Windows: Restraint of
Trade in English, Scottish, and Australian Employment Laws(-) Emerging and Enduring
Issues, 26 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 167, 168 (2010).
128. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 327 (rejecting argument that Sherman Act § 1 “does not
mean what the language used therein plainly imports, but that it only means to declare illegal
any such contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade” (emphasis added)).
129. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
130. Id. at 568 (“To suppose . . . that the effect of the decision in the Trans-Missouri case
is to render illegal most business contracts . . . , however indispensable and necessary they
may be . . . is to make a most violent assumption, and one not called for or justified by the
decision mentioned, or by any other decision of this court.”).
131. 221 U.S. at 60.
132. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
133. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-Examined, 67 BUS. LAW. 435,
435 (2012) (“From the beginning, federal courts have been troubled by the open-ended nature
of the Brandeis formulation of the Rule of Reason . . . .”).
134. See Werden, supra note 9, at 728 (“Brandeis invited only the justification that a
restraint makes the market work better.”).
135. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, § 2.1, at 71.
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conditions.”136 Importantly, Brandeis was hospitable to the proffered justifications
not because of any supposed effects on price or output. Rather, his opinion
contemplated (if a bit clumsily) the virtues of correcting market failures by, e.g.,
correcting information asymmetries.137
B. The Competitive Process Era
Beginning approximately with Northern Pacific in 1958,138 the Court entered its
“Competitive Process Era,”139 a period characterized by plaintiff-friendly
rulemaking.140 During this era, the Court condemned outright many restraints that
have subsequently been treated with less suspicion. Few, if any, virtues could
insulate a restraint from antitrust liability. 141 The Northern Pacific Court, for
example, unanimously condemned tying arrangements as per se illegal.142 Albrecht,
decided in 1968, imposed a similar per se ban on vertical maximum-resale-price
agreements.143 In 1972, the Topco majority applied the per se rule to market-division
agreements,144 despite evidence suggesting that the challenged agreement was not
harmful.145

136. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
137. Id. (“Before [the restraint’s] adoption, bids were made privately. Men had to buy and
sell without adequate knowledge of actual market conditions. This was disadvantageous to all
concerned, but particularly so to country dealers and farmers.”).
138. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
139. Some scholars instead refer to this as the Court’s “inhospitality era.” Meese, supra
note 57, at 146.
140. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, § 2.1, at 82 (“1960’s antitrust policy . . .
was openly hostile toward innovation and large scale development, and a zealous protector of
the right of small business to operate independently.”).
141. Though this Article focuses on restraints of trade, merger case law during this time
exhibited analogous hostility to “efficiencies” defenses. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen
competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting
competition.”). Subsequent courts have hewed closer to this precedent than to analogous
restraints-of-trade precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 96
(D.D.C. 2017) (requiring “proof of extraordinary efficiencies” to justify a presumptively
anticompetitive merger).
142. 356 U.S. at 8.
143. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
144. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
145. See Alan J. Meese, Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of
Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1782 n.56 (2006). For a contrary view, see Peter
C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer Look, in
ANTITRUST STORIES 174–76 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). Carstensen and
First suggest, rather persuasively, that at least some members of the Court were concerned
about the possibility that Topco members could have used Topco as a vehicle to launch
multiple private-label brands, thus eliminating the possibility that a given member would be
able to free-ride off a nearby rival member’s promotional efforts. Thus, for example, a Giant
grocery store could carry and promote its own Giant private-label goods, while a nearby 7Eleven store could carry and promote its own 7-Eleven-branded private label. Giant’s
promotional efforts would presumably be designed to increase consumer awareness of its own
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These decisions were primarily concerned with protecting “competition” or the
“competitive process,” rather than consumer welfare. 146 The Northern Pacific Court
was troubled by tying arrangements’ “pernicious effect on competition.” 147 The
Albrecht Court condemned vertical maximum-resale-price agreements as per se
illegal out of concern that such “schemes” disrupt “the forces of the competitive
market.”148 The Topco majority flatly rejected the defendant’s proffered
justifications, reasoning that antitrust tribunals are unable “to weigh, in any
meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against
promotion of competition in another sector.” 149
But these decisions never defined, exactly, what constitutes “competition” or the
“competitive process.”150 Instead, these opinions explained themselves by reference
to an ill-defined bundle of “rights” and “freedoms.” The Northern Pacific Court, for
example, fretted over the loss of landowners’ “freedom to deal with competing
carriers.”151 The Albrecht majority was concerned that vertical maximum resale price
agreements “cripple the freedom of traders.”152 The Topco majority stated that the
antitrust laws protect “our fundamental personal freedoms,” 153 and that “guaranteed
each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert
with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.”154 Beautiful though Justice Marshall’s prose may be, what guidance does it

private label, eliminating the possibility that 7-Eleven could take a free ride. See id. Even
assuming this was a realistic possibility, however, it is difficult to see how the restraints could
have meaningfully harmed the relevant markets, given the paltry market shares held by
Topco’s members.
146. See Werden, supra note 9, at 757.
147. 356 U.S. at 5. That said, the Court also foreshadowed the Modern Era by emphasizing
the centrality of efficiency to antitrust law: “[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources . . . .” Id. at 4.
148. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
149. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 609–10.
150. Indeed, as Orbach (a proponent of the “competition/competitive-process” standard)
observes, “[i]n 1890, Congress passed a competition law without meaningfully talking about
competition.” Orbach, supra note 97, at 2268. That said, Orbach points out that a great number
of these decisions did, in fact, invoke “competition” as the relevant touchstone for analysis, an
observation that aligns with the present claims. See id. at 2270 n.96 (citing City of Lafayette
v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (“[By enacting the Sherman Act,]
Congress . . . sought to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle
governing commerce in this country.”); see also Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610 (“Antitrust
laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 330 (1962) (“[A]ntitrust laws . . . are intended primarily to preserve and stimulate
competition.”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
151. 356 U.S. at 8.
152. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
153. 405 U.S. at 610.
154. Id.
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offer? To a given lower court attempting to assess a particular justification, what does
it mean?
In practice, using the “competitive process” as the sine qua non of antitrust
liability meant that the existence of almost any nonstandard contractual arrangement
could satisfy a plaintiff’s initial burden. The Court’s vision of “competition” seems
to have involved large numbers of small sellers and buyers transacting via simple
spot contracts. Any agreement deviating from that ideal therefore represented a threat
to the competitive process. All a plaintiff needed to do to satisfy its initial burden
was to demonstrate the existence of the challenged restraint. As a result, this era was
relatively plaintiff-friendly.
But viewing these decisions through the lens of procompetitive-justification
analysis reveals an additional insight: the Competitive-Process Era was also
distinctly defendant-unfriendly. Using the competitive process as the touchstone for
antitrust liability not only lowers the bar for plaintiffs attempting to show competitive
harm, but also forecloses the primary—perhaps the only—avenue available to
defendants attempting to offer justifications. Consider the Topco majority’s opinion,
which observed that “[i]mplicit in such freedom is the notion that [competition]
cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.” 155
In other words, defendants could not argue that unrestrained competition was
producing suboptimal results. That raises a question: If defendants could not make
that argument, could they ever justify their conduct? The apparent answer—reflected
in the multiplicity of per se illegality rules established or reaffirmed during this
period—was that they could not.
These decisions were subsequently relegated (for the most part156) to the dustbin
of history. The Court explicitly overruled many of them, 157 and has substantially
eroded others.158 The Competitive-Process Era met its end less than twenty years
after Northern Pacific marked its birth.

155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Topco has not been explicitly overruled, though some lower courts have blatantly
disregarded it. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1985); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.14, at 160 (5th ed. 2008) (“The question arises whether [such
cases] are reconcilable with Topco or whether they are mere examples of judicial activism by
lower federal court judges.”).
157. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977)
(overruling the per se rule for vertical exclusive-territory restrictions announced in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
158. Compare, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
(requiring a finding of market power before condemning tying arrangements), with N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting a requirement of “monopoly power”
and requiring only “sufficient economic power”).
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C. The Modern Era
By 1977, the economic conceptions of efficiency and market failure had gained
considerable clarity. In GTE Sylvania, often heralded as marking the beginning of
the “Modern Era” of antitrust,159 the Court reversed its earlier per se prohibition of
vertical exclusive-territory restraints. At a high level, the rationale for treating such
restraints with less suspicion was their likelihood of creating “efficiencies.” 160 More
specifically, the majority reasoned such restraints can alleviate “market
imperfections such as the so-called ‘free rider’ effect.” 161 Thus, the Court ushered in
the Modern Era of antitrust by explicitly invoking the market-failure approach to
justification analysis. Free-riding—which can cause welfare-reducing
underproduction—results from the presence of externalities, a common cause of
market failure.162 Note also that the Court’s focus was not limited to whether the
restraint created a particular type of marketplace effect, such as higher output or
lower prices.163 Rather, the Court held that certain restraints may be justified where
they alleviate market failures.
One year later, the Court issued a rather puzzling opinion best understood as a
leftover from the Competitive Process Era. Professional Engineers involved a tradeassociation rule that prohibited members from submitting price bids to potential
customers.164 The association attempted to justify its rule by arguing that without the
rule, the market would produce suboptimally low-quality engineering services.165
This was a classic market-failure argument: a combination of information
asymmetries and irrational (time-inconsistent) behavior by consumers caused the
unrestrained market to fail to optimize welfare.166
In sweeping language, however, Justice Stevens condemned the proffered
justification as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act.”167 Stevens castigated the association for arguing that competition itself was
“bad.”168 That was, of course, precisely what the association was arguing: that the
challenged restraint alleviated the relevant market’s tendency to produce “bad”
outcomes. The problem with this argument, according to Stevens, was that “the

159. See, e.g., Lindsey M. Edwards & Joshua D. Wright, The Death of Antitrust Safe
Harbors: Causes and Consequences, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205, 1205 (2016).
160. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54.
161. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
162. See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 314–16
(2004).
163. It was the concurring opinion that appeared more focused on the restraint’s “outputenhancing possibilities,” rather than its efficiency-enhancing possibilities. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. at 70 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
164. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684 (1978).
165. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), No. 76–1767, 1977 WL 205310,
at *54 (“NSPE contends . . . that . . . the submission of a bid . . . before the problem can
possibly be comprehended or an adequate approach to it proposed limits the amount and
quality of analysis ultimately applied to the problem . . . .”).
166. See John M. Newman, Rationalizing Procompetitive Justifications (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
167. Prof’l Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695.
168. Id.
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statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.”169 Professional Engineers thus appears to have employed the retrograde
competitive-process approach,170 which leaves little to no room for defendants to
proffer justifications. Stevens’s analysis was straightforward: (1) the Sherman Act
assumes that restraints on competition are bad, (2) the defendant restrained
competition, so (3) the defendant violated the Sherman Act. The competitive-process
approach effectively foreclosed the only possible means by which the defendant
could have justified its conduct.
The following year (1979), the Court issued BMI and with it signaled a clear return
to the market-failure approach. At issue was a joint copyright-licensing agreement
that involved horizontal price-fixing.171 Unrestrained, the relevant market exhibited
prohibitive transaction costs due to “the impracticability of negotiating individual
licenses for each composition.”172 The restraint eliminated such transaction costs,
which are a textbook source of market failure. 173 Eight justices—and the DOJ as
amicus—agreed that even a horizontal price-fixing agreement should receive ruleof-reason treatment where it alleviates a market failure. 174 Only Justice Stevens
dissented.175
In 1984, the Supreme Court again employed the market-failure approach to
justification analysis. NCAA v. Board of Regents involved an arrangement between
undergraduate universities to jointly license the right to televise amateur athletic

169. Id. Despite its peculiar reasoning, the Professional Engineers majority likely reached
the correct substantive outcome. There were likely alternative restraints available to the
association that would have been much less restrictive, yet still offered similar benefits. And,
as demonstrated below, Stevens’s hostility was most likely a misdirected response to the
particular type of market failure allegedly corrected by the restraint.
170. At the very least, Stevens invoked that approach. See Meese, supra note 57, at 109–
10 (arguing that the Professional Engineers Court actually applied a market-failure approach).
171. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
172. Id. at 15 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Certiorari,
K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
173. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
174. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 15 (“[T]he United States disagrees with the Court of
Appeals in this case and urges that the blanket licenses . . . are not per se violations of the
Sherman Act.”). Some subsequent authorities instead describe BMI as hinging on the output
increase caused by the restraint. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 964
(10th Cir. 1994). Under this view, BMI exemplifies the type-of-effect approach. But the Court
mentioned “output” only in passing, and not strictly in connection with procompetitive
justifications. 441 U.S. at 20 (framing the zero-step of analysis as a question of whether “the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output . . . , or instead one designed to ‘increase economic
efficiency’”) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)). The
majority did, however, place great weight on the fact that “a bulk license of some type is . . .
necessary to achieve the[] efficiencies.” Id. at 21. In other words, the reduction of transaction
costs (which had previously caused a market failure)—not the resulting output increase per
se—dictated Rule of Reason treatment.
175. BMI, 441 U.S. at 25.
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sporting events.176 Because such agreements can be “efficient,” the majority
opinion—written by none other than Justice Stevens—found per se treatment to be
inappropriate, even where the challenged restraint was a rather blatant outputreduction scheme.177
The NCAA majority at times did use the terms “efficiency” and “increase[d]
output” roughly interchangeably, 178 arguably suggesting a type-of-effect approach.
This is, however, not the best reading. Some early analysts, Bork in particular, often
appeared to conflate efficiency and higher output, but the modern consensus is that
higher output is not always an efficient outcome. 179 A variety of inefficient
conditions and strategies (externalized costs, coercion, overconsumption, deception,
etc.) can increase output.180 Thus, the NCAA Court’s emphasis on output effects can
most helpfully be understood not as endorsing Bork’s extreme-form type-of-effect
analysis, but as a response to the particular restraint at issue: an agreement to restrict
output. A decision analyzing an output restriction will naturally focus on output—
but it would be a mistake to conclude that all of antitrust is therefore limited to a
mechanical output analysis.
In 1997, State Oil Co. v. Khan overturned the decades-old per se rule against
vertical restraints setting maximum retail prices. 181 That rule traced its roots to
Albrecht,182 an opinion the Khan Court characterized as “grounded in the fear that
maximum price fixing by suppliers could interfere with dealer freedom.” 183
Ironically, as the Khan Court pointed out, the ban on vertical maximum price fixing
had prompted many suppliers to vertically integrate, thereby “eliminating the very
independent trader for whom Albrecht professed solicitude.”184 Justice O’Connor,
writing for a unanimous majority, identified the following procompetitive
justification for vertical maximum price fixing: “A supplier might . . . fix a maximum
resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly position.”185
Monopoly power (like transaction costs and externalities) is a textbook cause of
market failure.186 By overruling Albrecht and disapproving of its normative basis,
Khan emphatically rejected the competitive-process approach. And by focusing on
the restraint’s alleviation of a market failure, rather than its effect on output, Khan
continued the Modern Era’s embrace of the market-failure approach.

176. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
177. Id. at 103. The Court ultimately rejected the NCAA’s proffered justifications
(“efficiency justification[s]”) as being factually and legally unsupported. See id. at 114–15.
178. Id. at 114.
179. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 121.
180. See infra notes 292–95 and accompanying text.
181. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
182. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
183. 522 U.S. at 16.
184. Id. at 16–17 (quoting 8 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1635, at 395 (1989)).
185. Id. at 16 (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
186. RICHARD G. LIPSEY & COLIN HARBURY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 169
(2d ed. 1992) (“[T]here is clearly a case to be made against monopoly on grounds of market
failure . . . .”).
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The Supreme Court’s most recent in-depth justification analysis appeared in its
2007 Leegin decision.187 The Leegin Court again employed the language of market
failure and efficiency, this time to strike down a longstanding rule that vertical
minimum resale price restraints were per se illegal. Because such restraints may often
be the “most efficient way”188 to lower certain transaction costs,189 decrease
information asymmetries,190 and prevent free riding from “forcing [firms] to cut back
[their] services to a level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer,”191 the Court
rejected per se illegality in favor of the rule of reason. Each of these—transaction
costs, information asymmetries, and free rider problems—is a textbook cause of
market failure. More recently still, the 2018 Ohio v. American Express Co. decision
mentioned alleviating “negative externalities”—another textbook source of market
failure192—as a possible procompetitive justification. 193
In sum, nearly a century of U.S. Supreme Court antitrust precedent counsels in
favor of the market-failure approach to justification analysis.194 Against this

187. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
188. Id. at 892.
189. Id. (“It may be difficult and inefficient for a manufacturer to make and enforce a
contract with a retailer specifying the different services the retailer must perform.”).
190. Id. at 891 (observing that resale-price maintenance may incentivize new entry by
inducing firms to “make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in
the distribution of products unknown to the consumer” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added)).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, NOTES,
AND OTHER MATERIALS 176 (2d ed. 1981).
193. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2289 (2018) (“These agreements
actually stem negative externalities in the credit-card market.”).
194. The Court’s Modern Era jurisprudence does frequently invoke the adage that antitrust
laws are meant to protect “competition, not competitors.” See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 906 (quoting
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)); Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320). But it has generally done so in the
context of “antitrust injury.” The statement originated in Brown Shoe, a case that condemned
a merger between horizontal rivals that possessed relatively small market shares. Brown Shoe,
370 U.S. at 319–21. But the particular discussion in Brown Shoe involved two hypothetical
mergers that would not (per the majority) have violated Clayton Act § 7: “a merger between
two small companies to enable the combination to compete more effectively with larger
corporations dominating the relevant market” (presumably due to economies of scale) and “a
merger between a corporation which is financially healthy and a failing one which no longer
can be a vital competitive factor in the market.” Id. at 319. The Court was, in Brunswick Corp.,
faced with the former. And in that case, citing Brown Shoe, the Court identified the “antitrust
injury” doctrine. Under that doctrine, a plaintiff cannot make out an antitrust claim by alleging
that it has (for example) lost customers to a more efficient rival. The Court’s subsequent
reiterations of this maxim have been in similar contexts and are properly understood as
references to this discrete concept, rather than a full-throated endorsement of the competitiveprocess standard. Indeed, at least one of these subsequent invocations was expressly welfarerelated. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 906 (referring to state fair-trade laws as “[d]ivorced from
competition and consumer welfare” and “designed to save inefficient small retailers from their
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backdrop, the relatively brief Competitive Process Era appears to be a historical
aberration. And had Professional Engineers been issued just a few years earlier, it
would today most likely be viewed as simply another relic of that bygone age. It is
only by historical accident that Professional Engineers falls within what has become
viewed as the Modern Era of antitrust, an accident that has perhaps caused it to attract
more than its share of scholarly attention. In fact, Professional Engineers was at least
arguably overruled by multiple subsequent decisions, including the majority opinion
in NCAA v. Board of Regents—which Stevens himself penned.195 In hindsight, it
seems Justice Stevens was wrong to flatly condemn all justifications that hinge on
unrestrained competition producing “bad” outcomes. The majority of modern
precedent holds that alleviating a market failure is an acceptable procompetitive
justification.
D. Assessing Non-Welfare “Justifications”
Antitrust defendants occasionally proffer non-welfare-related explanations for
their conduct. As we have seen, however, the bulk of authority indicates that only
alleviating a market failure—and thereby increasing welfare—can give rise to a valid
justification. It follows that, at least as a purely doctrinal matter, non-welfare
explanations should not be cognizable under the rule of reason, i.e., they should not
come into play either at the zero-step of analysis or during a full-scale inquiry.
Instead, such explanations are to be considered only at the very outset of judicial
decision-making.
It is worth pausing to note that this Article employs the signifier “non-welfare” to
refer to justifications unrelated to the economic conceptions of welfare and market
failure. Elsewhere, such justifications are occasionally discussed under the
appellation “noneconomic.”196 But “economic” as a modifier could apply to every
possible justification—Merriam-Webster, for example, defines “economic” as “of,
relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services.”197 Moreover, modern economics as a discipline encompasses an
exceedingly broad variety of subject matters.198 Whether anything at all (or at least
anything that could be the subject of an antitrust lawsuit) remains “non-economic”
is rather doubtful. As the scope of the discipline continues to grow, the
“economic/non-economic” dichotomy becomes increasingly unhelpful.199

inability to compete,” in “contrast” with antitrust laws).
195. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
196. See, e.g., Julie L. Seitz, Comment, Consideration of Noneconomic Procompetitive
Justifications in the MIT Antitrust Case, 44 EMORY L.J. 395 (1995); see also Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (“The issue
among most serious people has never been whether non-economic considerations should
outweigh significant long-term economies of scale, but rather whether they had any role to
play at all . . . .”).
197. Economic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/economic [https://perma.cc/AR6G-6W65].
198. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Altruism and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 156 (1993).
199. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 797 (1989) (“[A] distinction is drawn between . . . efficiency goals
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Consequently, the present discussion dispenses with “non-economic” in favor of the
more descriptive “non-welfare.”
The antitrust enterprise does immunize some truly non-welfare-motivated
conduct from liability. But this immunity is bestowed by labeling such conduct
“noncommercial” at the very outset of a given case. Noncommercial conduct falls
outside the ambit of the Sherman Act, which by its terms applies only to “trade” or
“commerce.”200 Thus, for example, the Eighth Circuit in Missouri v. NOW201
declined to apply antitrust law to a boycott organized by the National Organization
for Women (NOW). NOW refused to hold conventions in states that had not ratified
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 202 Recognizing the
boycott’s “social” and “political” purpose, the court deemed the challenged restraint
to be outside the scope of the Sherman Act. 203 This decision was reached before the
zero-stage of analysis (deciding whether to apply the rule of reason or the per se rule),
and certainly before proceeding to the justification step of full-scale rule of reason
analysis. On somewhat analogous facts (a politically motivated boycott), the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed similar sentiments. 204
But lower courts have occasionally attempted to weigh non-welfare justifications
as part of a full-scale rule of reason analysis. USA Equestrian provides a rather
striking example. The case involved horse show competitions organized by a national
governing body whose members owned the horses that competed in the shows.205

and . . . nonefficiency goals. Although it is tempting to label these two categories ‘economic’
and ‘noneconomic’ goals, those labels are less useful . . . because there is substantial economic
content even in the social and political goals.”). In fact, the term was likely unhelpful from the
beginning. Modern economics stakes out incredibly broad territory—the American Economic
Association, for example, defines “economics” as “the study of scarcity, the study of how
people use resources, or the study of decision-making.” What Is Economics? Understanding
the
Discipline,
AM.
ECON.
ASS’N,
https://www.aeaweb.org/resources
/students/what-is-economics [https://perma.cc/XTN9-EFRY]. With such an all-encompassing
definition in place, one might well ask whether any aspect of human interaction could properly
be considered “noneconomic.” For an admirably broad early definition, see LIONEL ROBBINS,
AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 4 (Macmillan 1932)
(“The definition of Economics which would probably command most adherents . . . is that
which relates it to the study of the causes of material welfare.”).
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (prohibiting restraints “of trade or commerce”); id. § 2
(banning monopolization or attempted monopolization of “any part of . . . trade or
commerce”); see also John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (2015) (analyzing whether zero-price products constitute “trade
or commerce” under the Sherman Act).
201. Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
202. Id. at 1302–03.
203. See id. at 1311–12; see also id. at 1319 (“We hold today that the Sherman Act does
not cover NOW’s boycott activities . . . .”).
204. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982) (“[T]he purpose
of petitioners’ campaign was not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to
vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself.”).
205. JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., No. 802CV1585T24MAP, 2005 WL
1126665 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005).
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The governing body issued a rule—subsequently challenged as a restraint of trade—
granting “officially recognized” status to same-day shows only when the shows were
to take place more than 250 miles apart.206 The district court located a valid
procompetitive justification in the fact that the restraint “promote[d] the health and
welfare of the horses.”207 It goes nearly without saying that these goals are unrelated
to consumer welfare or the economic conception of market failure. 208
Similarly, in Brown University, the Third Circuit was hospitable to what could be
viewed as a non-welfare justification.209 At issue was an agreement among a group
of Ivy League colleges to award financial aid only on the basis of need and to ensure
that aid offers would be comparable across colleges.210 In its defense, MIT (the only
college that proceeded to trial) argued that the restraint facilitated access to education
for financially disadvantaged students. The court credited this justification, in a
decision that attracted substantial criticism.211 MIT’s argument—noble though it may
have been—was unrelated to an economic market failure.212 To be sure, the court
attempted to dress this justification in the language of “consumer choice.” 213 But the
restraint did not create a new product, thereby increasing “consumer choice” as that
term is used in the antitrust context.214

206. Id. at *2 & n.3.
207. Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
208. One could argue that an externality is at play, but it is, at best, not the sort of
externality contemplated by antitrust law and economics. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 7 n.18 (1988) (“An externality arises when the consumption of
a good by a consumer directly affects the welfare of another consumer, or when a firm’s
production affects other economic agents.” (emphasis added)). The nature of those affected is
the key distinction. Antitrust law can properly recognize (e.g.) investments in promotional
materials as creating an externality because such investment directly affects other economic
agents. By way of contrast, an owner’s behavior may detrimentally affect her horse’s health,
but that “cost” is not an imposed as an “externality” in the antitrust sense of the term, even
though a layperson might (perhaps understandably) view such harm as an externalized cost.
209. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1997).
210. Id. at 662.
211. See, e.g., Seitz, supra note 196, at 427 (“Allowing courts to consider social,
noneconomic justifications injects an unacceptable level of politics and personal opinion into
antitrust analysis.”).
212. It is also possible to conceive of MIT’s argument as market-failure-based, although
doing so requires admitting that irrational behavior is a real phenomenon, a notion that is
anathema to orthodox law-and-economics theorists. Students benefit from a diverse
educational environment, yet students (particularly nondiverse students) are irrationally
unwilling to pay higher prices in exchange for a higher-quality education. MIT did not clearly
make this case, however, in what may have been a strategic decision to avoid the hot-button
topic of irrational behavior. A subsequent paper by this Author explores whether alleviating
behavioral market failures is a cognizable justification. See Newman, supra note 166.
213. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 675 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 U.S.
85, 101 (1984), for the proposition that consumer choice can be a valid procompetitive
justification).
214. NCAA, upon which the Third Circuit relied, was addressing a market (amateur
collegiate sports) in which some horizontal restraints were necessary in order for the product
to be offered at all. 468 U.S. at 101.
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Most recently, in O’Bannon v. NCAA, the Ninth Circuit waffled between treating
a justification under the rubric of market failure or through a non-welfare lens—but
appeared ready to credit the justification either way. 215 There, the challenged restraint
was an NCAA rule prohibiting member schools from compensating student-athletes
for the use of their names, images, and likenesses. 216 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that, by preserving “amateurism,” the rule could
procompetitively increase consumer (i.e., viewer) demand. 217
It is possible to view this holding as an application of the market-failure approach.
Markets can fail where a given course of action is immediately surplus-maximizing
for an individual group member, yet, when undertaken by the entire group, leaves all
group members worse off. An individual school may be incentivized to pay its own
athletes in order to produce a winning team. But other schools would then be
incentivized to follow suit, even if the resulting shift away from amateurism would
reduce overall demand for the product.218 In other words, individually rational
choices could result in all schools producing a more costly, yet less desirable,
product.
But the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon also came quite close to blessing amateurism
per se, as if amateurism carries intrinsic benefits unrelated to efficiency. 219 The
appellate panel fretted that “the district court ignored that not paying student–athletes
is precisely what makes them amateurs”220 and that paying players any amount would
remove all “basis for returning to a rule of amateurism,” transforming college
football into “minor league football.”221 But the court did not explain why—in terms
of consumer welfare—that state of affairs would be undesirable.
Decisions like these represent bad law and bad policy. Doctrinally, they represent
an unwarranted deviation from established precedent. 222 As the foregoing
demonstrates, only those restraints that alleviate an economic market failure are
cognizable as procompetitive justifications. Proper rule of reason analysis therefore
does not recognize non-welfare justifications as valid. In fact, as most readers have
likely already concluded, the name is something of a misnomer: as part of a rule of
reason analysis, these “justifications” are anything but. 223
Modern antitrust law’s approach to non-welfare justifications represents a
balanced compromise. On the one hand, the antitrust enterprise seeks to further its
consensus goal of promoting consumer welfare. On the other, it should not do so ad

215. See 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
216. Id. at 1052.
217. Id. at 1059.
218. See generally Stucke, supra note 87, at 187–90 (describing various examples of
divergence between individual and group interests).
219. In this way, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion echoed Justice White’s dissent in NCAA v.
Board of Regents of Oklahoma, which argued in favor of recognizing “noneconomic values
like the promotion of amateurism.” 468 U.S. 85, 134 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
220. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original).
221. Id. at 1078–79.
222. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 262 (summarizing cases
holding that noncommercial activities are immune from antitrust liability).
223. Hence the scare quotes in the title of this Section.
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infinitum—there are other goals than these, 224 and a single-minded pursuit of
economic welfare may have the perverse effect of leaving society worse off. Antitrust
doctrinally recognizes the need for balance by immunizing truly nonwelfaremotivated, or “noncommercial,” conduct, as did the Missouri v. NOW court.225
Extending such comity to the second step of a full-scale rule of reason analysis,
however, would upset that careful balance.
Crediting non-welfare justifications during rule of reason analyses creates
awkward, and essentially intractable, commensurability problems. Cases that
proceed to the procompetitive-justifications stage can already present difficult tradeoffs: how, for example, should a court balance quality improvements against price
increases?226 But if such cases are difficult, adding social and moral considerations
to the mix would make them nigh impossible. 227 How is a generalist court supposed
to weigh improved horses’ health against an increase in horse show ticket prices?
How does increasing access to prestigious colleges for financially disadvantaged
students stack up against higher tuition prices to other students? What is the value of
“amateurism” as a virtue unto itself, and how does it compare to lower wages for
student-athletes? These questions are alien to antitrust law and economics.
Such policy questions are better answered by the legislative branch. Indeed, that
is exactly what Congress did in response to the Justice Department lawsuit
underlying Brown University. In 1992, the same year the Third Circuit’s decision
was issued, Congress enacted an antitrust exemption for the specific conduct at issue
in that case.228 The exemption has subsequently been extended repeatedly,
demonstrating that Congress is capable of intervening if and when necessary. 229
III. ERROR-COST ANALYSIS
We have seen that the market-failure approach is correct as a purely doctrinal
matter. But does it also function better than the alternatives? The modern antitrust
enterprise is concerned with the social costs of erroneous decisions. 230 Failures to

224. Cf. STEPHEN KING, THE GUNSLINGER 266 (2003) (“Go then, there are other worlds
than these.”).
225. See Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
226. Allensworth, supra note 4, at 4 (“[C]ompetition—whether defined as a process or as
a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. Antitrust law often
must trade off one kind of competition for another, or one salutary effect of competition (such
as price, quality or innovation) for another. And in so doing, antitrust courts must make
judgments between different and incommensurate values.”).
227. If, as Allensworth points out, trading off price and quality effects is difficult, the tradeoffs discussed above would, indeed, seem nearly impossible.
228. See 154 CONG. REC. 22,817 (2008) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“This exemption
originated because Congress disagreed with a suit brought by the Department of Justice against
nine colleges for their efforts to use common criteria to assess each student’s financial need.”).
229. The JES Properties litigation likewise reached its ultimate conclusion via legislative
action, though somewhat more indirectly. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding that the defendants were granted implied antitrust immunity by the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d
1224 (11th Cir. 2006).
230. See Easterbrook, supra note 24.
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condemn anticompetitive behavior (false negatives) reduce welfare, as do decisions
that condemn procompetitive behavior (false positives). All else equal, the optimal
approach to procompetitive-justification analysis is the one that most effectively
minimizes such error costs. As the following discussion demonstrates, the marketfailure approach does so.
A. Competitive Process: Imprecision and False Positives
In addition to the anachronistic Competitive Process Era decisions, the Court’s
more modern rule of reason jurisprudence occasionally refers to restraints’ “impact
on competition”231 and “the competitive process.”232 Scholar-enforcer Gregory
Werden locates in such references and in Professional Engineers a “single-minded
focus on the competitive process.”233 Under this view, because “Congress has
established a legislative policy favoring competition,” 234 defendants cannot justify
restraining the competitive process by pointing to failures of that same competitive
process. Other scholars have descriptively and prescriptively argued in favor of a
competition- or competitive-process-based approach to antitrust analysis.235
But without more clarity, the competitive-process approach offers far too little
guidance. As a result, it carries substantial risk of producing both false negatives and
false positives.236 Although the modern Court sometimes invokes the virtues of
“competition” and the “competitive process,” 237 it has never explained what those
“wonderfully ill-defined” terms actually mean.238 Werden argues forcefully for the
competitive-process approach without ever seeming to define “competitive
process.”239 How is competitive-process analysis supposed to proceed? Werden

231. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“[T]he test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”).
232. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
233. Werden, supra note 9, at 732–37.
234. Hammer, supra note 24, at 854–55. Hammer does not subscribe to this view, but
merely observes its existence.
235. See, e.g., Orbach, supra note 97; Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 98 (arguing for a return
to the “competition ideal”).
236. Bork criticized “competition” on these grounds. See BORK, supra note 79, at 58 (“The
fact that judges, like the rest of us, have used the word to mean very different things has
resulted in the fruitless discourse of men talking past each other.”).
237. See supra note 194 (explaining that these references are best understood in the unique
context of “antitrust injury” and not as a return to a purely competitive-process-based
approach).
238. Indeed, as Hammer observes, “[c]ompetition is a wonderfully ill-defined term.”
Hammer, supra note 24, at 850 n.3.
239. The clearest definition this Author could locate is as follows:
[R]ules designed to ensure the control of economic power that is incompatible
with the social and political values of a just community, the integrity of
individualism in that community, and the ideal of equality of economic
opportunity. . . . [This approach] is often identified by the concept of a
‘competitive process’ and derives its meaning from a multiplicity of social

532

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:501

admits that restraints are sometimes justified where “they make the market work
better.”240 But what does “better” mean in this context? If it means simply “more
efficient,”241 then the competitive-process approach adds no value. Werden posits
that “a defendant cannot justify a restraint on the basis that it promotes social or
consumer welfare in any way other than through promoting competition” 242—but
admits that “[n]evertheless, a restraint likely would be permitted if the factfinder
determined it was necessary to public health or safety.” 243 Why would this be so, if
there were not some value at play other than the “competitive process” (or, at the
very least, some other chosen means for promoting that value)?
Perhaps “competition” means a state of atomistic rivalry in the spot market, to be
pursued as an end unto itself244 or in order to vindicate the vaguely defined grouping
of rights discussed above.245 During the Competitive Process Era, nearly every
restraint was condemned,246 suggesting that not much more than standard, one-off
contracts could escape liability. That approach almost certainly produced excessive

sciences including history, economics, philosophy, political science, and
sociology.
John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 893, 897 (1990). While arguably an apt description of the Sherman Act’s overarching
goals, it is difficult to ascertain how this approach would guide justification analysis in a given
case.
240. Werden, supra note 9, at 754 (emphasis added).
241. There is some suggestion of this—Werden concludes that because “vertical restraints
hold the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively,
. . . they normally do not harm the competitive process.” Id. at 750 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
242. Id. at 753.
243. Id. at 753 n.258.
244. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why
Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 836 (2016) (“During
antitrust’s ‘inhospitality era,’ courts declared . . . agreements unlawful per se, drawing upon
economic theory hostile to various contracts that, although not naked, thwarted atomistic
competition by restraining the conduct of trading partners.”); Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork’s
Forgotten Role in the Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 954 (2014)
(describing the “inhospitality tradition of antitrust: an instinctive hostility to business conduct
other than moment-by-moment rivalry in the spot market” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
245. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. Stucke and Ezrachi appear to endorse
a vision along these lines, advocating a “competition ideal” as a replacement for the consumer
welfare standard. See Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 98 (“The competition ideal was the belief,
in line with democratic principles, in dispersing economic and political power from the hands
of a few, to foster greater opportunities to compete, improve, and win.” (emphasis in original)).
Intriguingly, Stucke and Ezrachi cite to Hayek as a supporter of this view: as they point out,
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom observes that “in order that competition should work
beneficially, a carefully thought-out legal framework is required.” Id. (quoting FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 45 (condensed version 1999)). Hayek goes on to state that
“[t]he successful use of competition does not preclude some types of government
interference,” and that “break[ing] up monopolies” is a task that “provide[s] a wide and
unquestioned field for state activity.” HAYEK, supra, at 46.
246. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 9, at 729 (“Northern Pacific began an era during which
the Supreme Court saw a ‘pernicious effect’ in every restraint it examined.”).
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false positives—courts using it systematically condemned beneficial restraints. In
fact, the entire agenda of the Chicago School of antitrust can largely be distilled into
one objective: to critique the rules crafted during the Competitive Process Era on the
grounds that they excessively condemned welfare-enhancing conduct.247 That
objective was, of course, largely achieved. A variety of restraints that reduce
“competition-as-atomistic-rivalry,” even horizontal price-fixing248 or marketallocation249 agreements, can potentially pass muster under modern antitrust law.
Thus, the competitive-process approach is either so ill-defined as to be effectively
devoid of content, or it produces results so one-sided that the Court abandoned it
after a brief dalliance. If the former, then the competitive-process approach will very
likely yield a great deal of both false positives and negatives, randomly distributed.
If the latter, it will yield—and, during the Inhospitality Era, did yield 250—very few
false negatives but an inordinate amount of false positives, skewing the field
systematically in favor of plaintiffs. Either way, this approach fails to perform its
supposed task of sorting legal (“reasonable”) from illegal (“unreasonable”)
conduct.251
Even if Congress intended some ill-defined conception of “competition” to serve
as the overarching goal of the antitrust laws, the decision rules for promoting that
goal may—and, it seems, must—nonetheless comprise something other than
competition itself. Some standard is needed in order to distinguish between
reasonable and unreasonable restraints. The undefined competitive-process approach
fails to do so.

247. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 79, at 7 (“Certain of its doctrines preserve competition,
while others suppress it, resulting in a policy at war with itself.”).
248. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Christopher Leslie, Comment,
Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal PriceFixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 263 (1993) (calling the joint license in BMI “the essence of
price-fixing”); see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing some
procompetitive justifications for a horizontal agreement to fix prices paid by universities for
the right to student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses).
249. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (productmarket allocation); cf. United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:16-CF-403DS, 2017 WL
3720695 (D. Utah June 22, 2017) (holding that the rule of reason applied to an alleged
customer allocation scheme that the Government had sought to prosecute criminally).
250. E.g., Meese, supra note 57, at 146.
251. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“[A]s the contracts
or acts embraced in [Sherman Act § 1] were not expressly defined, since the enumeration
addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being broad enough to embrace every
conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning trade or commerce or
the subjects of such commerce, and thus caused any act done by any of the enumerated
methods anywhere in the whole field of human activity to be illegal if in restraint of trade, it
inevitably follows . . . that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law
and in this country . . . was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining
whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which
the statute provided.”).
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B. Type of Effect: Imprecision, False Positives, and False Negatives
The type-of-effect approach fares no better. In addition to being out of step
doctrinally, it yields incorrect outcomes in at least three ways. The first yields
excessive false positives. The second produces excessive false negatives. The third
creates confusion, which tends to increase the likelihood of both types of error.
First, the type-of-effect approach will cause analysts to mistakenly reject
justifications that should be recognized as valid, causing false-positive errors. Some
justifications enhance welfare, yet cause a type of effect that is not included on the
usual checklists. “Higher output,” for example, is universally included as a good type
of effect.252 (Recall that some analysts even argue higher output is the only good type
of effect.) Yet certain restraints of trade can increase welfare by lowering output. A
type-of-effect analyst would wrongly condemn such restraints.
Consider the restraints on false and misleading advertising at issue in California
Dental.253 Deception can increase output of the deceiver’s product, yet reduce
consumer welfare. The U.S. Supreme Court appeared to recognize as much, noting
that the challenged restraints “could have different effects from those ‘normally’
found in the commercial world, even to the point of promoting competition by
reducing the occurrence of unverifiable and misleading across-the-board discount
advertising.”254 Misleading advertisements regarding discounts could—indeed, are
designed to—increase output. Restraints on misleading advertisements may decrease
output, yet increase consumer welfare. As a result, the Court held that such restraints
may be justified. Yet a lower court or enforcement agency applying the type-of-effect
approach would likely condemn the restraints, following the simplistic logic that all
output-reducing restraints are anticompetitive.
A restraint may also alleviate a market failure caused by overconsumption,
reducing output of the relevant product while increasing consumer welfare. Suppose
that an organization made up of higher educational institutions (law schools, perhaps)
is tasked with overseeing its own members’ accreditation status. Member schools
face mandatory public disclosure of all information relevant to prospective students’
cost-benefit analysis (tuition, employment rates, debt load, and the like).
Nonetheless, some students irrationally attend a subpar institution that offers little
hope of employment in exchange for a six-figure price tag.255 Eventually, the

252. At the very least, this Author is not aware of any type-of-effect checklist that does not
include higher output as a valid justification.
253. California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
254. Id. at 773–74.
255. Some argue that (some) law schools fit this description. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The
Law-School Scam, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2014 (“This world [of for-profit legal education] is one in
which schools accredited by the American Bar Association admit large numbers of severely
underqualified students; these students in turn take out hundreds of millions of dollars in loans
annually, much of which they will never be able to repay.”); Michael Simkovic & Frank
McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 1 (Harv. L. Sch. Ctr. on the Legal Profession,
Research Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2250585 [https://perma.cc/Z4MP-A5T2] (“Legal academics and journalists have
marshaled statistics purporting to show that enrolling in law school is irrational.”). Behavioral
economics research on consumers’ intertemporal irrationality could offer a ready explanation
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accrediting organization strips the subpar school of its accreditation, effectively
foreclosing that competitor from the market. The accrediting organization’s conduct
could invite antitrust litigation, raising the question of whether it is justified.256 The
restraint likely reduces output of the relevant product, and would therefore be
condemned as anticompetitive under the type-of-effect approach. Yet accreditation
decisions like this can rather obviously benefit consumers.
As a final example, consider the U.S. chemical industry’s “Responsible Care”
initiative.257 Under this initiative, members of a trade association agree to reduce
environmental pollution,258 an externality that causes market failures.259 Such efforts
almost certainly decrease output, yet the U.S. government actively encourages
them.260 In some market contexts, it seems lower output is a socially desirable result.
An analyst employing the type-of-effect approach would likely condemn the
restraints in each of these cases. Each tends to lower output, a prototypical
“anticompetitive effect.”261 But such restraints are justifiable; they alleviate market
failures.262 Holding otherwise is, as a doctrinal matter, incorrect. Thus, for example,

for such behavior. Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 103, 103 (1999).
256. Cf., e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 846 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (dismissing in part a complaint by an unaccredited law school against the American Bar
Association (ABA), the primary accreditation body for U.S. law schools, alleging that several
ABA accreditation standards were anticompetitive). On this topic generally, see Lao, supra
note 24.
257. Responsible Care, AM. CHEM. COUNCIL, https://responsiblecare.americanchemistry
.com/ [https://perma.cc/EDZ8-FWPY]; see also Keith Brouhle, Charles Griffiths & Ann
Wolverton, The Use of Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policymaking in the U.S.
(Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working Paper No. 04-05, 2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites
/production/files/2014-12/documents/the_use_of_voluntary_approaches_for_environmental
_policymaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LP6-U2PJ].
258. AM. CHEM. COUNCIL, supra note 257.
259. See, e.g., Boris N. Mamlyuk, Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and
Economics, 18 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 39 (2009).
260. Brouhle et al., supra note 257.
261. See BORK, supra note 79, at 122 (“The task of antitrust is to identify and prohibit those
forms of behavior whose net effect is output restricting . . . .”).
262. See supra Section II.C. An interesting—and important—question, though one beyond
the scope of this Article, is whether a restraint that lowers welfare in the relevant market can
ever be justified by virtue of the fact that it increases welfare overall. Put another way, is the
relevant market the exclusive arena within which effects are to be analyzed? Or is it, for lack
of a better word, permeable? Werden persuasively suggests that market definition plays a
broad role in constructing the “antitrust narrative” at issue in litigation. Gregory J. Werden,
Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow 14 (unpublished draft),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2004655
[https://perma.cc/VJW5
-4PEZ]. Perhaps, then, the relevant market does not dictate the precise metes and bounds of
every facet of a given antitrust case. And if that is true, then the environmental-pollution
justification at play in the hypothetical above could (potentially) be cognizable. If not,
however, the justification would likely be disallowed. Suppose that a given factory produces
widgets while polluting a river, harming downstream residents. Such harms would be invisible
under a pure partial-equilibrium analysis: they occur outside the relevant market for widgets.
And a justification comprising the reduction of such harms would fail.
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the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s California Dental decision, which
had invoked the type-of-effect approach to condemn the challenged restraint. 263 In
error-cost terms, the type-of-effect approach produces excessive false positives,
thereby harming those whom the antitrust laws are supposed to protect.
Second, the type-of-effect approach may lead courts to credit justifications that
should be rejected. By inviting an overly simplistic, surface-level version of
justification analysis, the type-of-effect approach can cause courts to skip over
crucial steps and wrongly credit sham justifications. Such decisions represent false
negatives.
In SCFC ILC, for example, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly credited a defendant’s
proffered “free riding” justification.264 Visa, then a horizontal association of banks,
excluded Sears (which issued the competing Discover card) from issuing Visa-brand
cards.265 Visa claimed its restraint was necessary to prevent Sears from “free riding.”
Yet it was entirely unclear how the restraint could have done so—or even upon what,
exactly, Sears could have taken a free ride.266 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit simply
accepted Visa’s invocation of “prevent[ing] free riding” as a shibboleth. 267 The
court’s opinion carries throughout the hallmarks of type-of-effect analysis.268 It
reasoned as follows: (1) “concern[] about free-riding” is one of the type of effects
that justify restraints, (2) Visa argued that its restraint prevented free riding, so (3)
the restraint was justified.269 A few years later, the government sued to enjoin Visa’s
exclusionary restraint. In a more rigorous decision that was upheld by the Second
Circuit, the district court rejected Visa’s proffered justification, 270 reinforcing the
conclusion that SCFC ILC was incorrectly decided.
Third, the type-of-effect approach can introduce unnecessary confusion into
antitrust doctrine, increasing the likelihood of both types of error. If assembling a
proper checklist of “procompetitive benefits” is the starting point, cases like
Professional Engineers become difficult—if not impossible—to synthesize. This is
why some analysts present the case as a “conundrum.”271 The Professional Engineers
Court seemed to suggest that “enhanced public safety and increased quality . . . [a]re
not the sort of virtues courts should consider.” 272 Yet such claims—particularly those

263. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1997) (“These restrictions are
in effect a form of output limitation, as they restrict the supply of information about individual
dentists’ services.”), rev’d, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
264. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).
265. Visa also excluded bank issuers that issued American Express cards. Id. at 961.
266. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 2223b & nn.3–4.
267. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 369, 383 (2005) (“Finally, unspecific free-rider claims are too often
used as a shibboleth.”).
268. The court described BMI, for example, as crediting “the efficiency justification of
increasing . . . aggregate output.” SCFC ILC, 36 F.3d at 964.
269. Id.
270. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d
229 (2d Cir. 2003).
271. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.3f, at 223.
272. Meese, supra note 145, at 1788 (“Simply put, the supposed benefits of the restriction
on price competition—enhanced public safety and increased quality—were not the sort of
virtues courts should consider when conducting a rule of reason analysis.”); see also SULLIVAN
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involving higher quality—have repeatedly met with approval from subsequent
courts. The Court itself extolled higher quality as a virtue in Leegin.273 Since different
market-failure correctives can push output, quality, etc. in different directions, the
type-of-effects approach creates unnecessary confusion over which types are actually
valid.
This mischief can be seen at play in Law v. NCAA.274 The Tenth Circuit’s checklist
of valid justifications included “creating operating efficiencies.”275 Yet the same
opinion also identified “cost savings” as a categorically invalid justification.276 One
wonders: What are “operating efficiencies” if not a type of “cost savings”? Other
courts have used the terms interchangeably. 277 And guidelines jointly issued by the
DOJ and FTC explicitly contemplate “cost savings” as a valid justification.278 What
is a court to make of this mess? Is “cost savings” on the valid checklist? The invalid
blacklist? Both?
As a final nail in the coffin, consider the nearly nonsensical analysis in AnheuserBusch, a case involving exclusive territorial restrictions imposed by a liquor
manufacturer on its wholesalers.279 By way of justification, the manufacturer
identified several types of “procompetitive effects,” including increased wholesaler
investments in “cosmetics.”280 The plaintiff argued in response that cosmetic features
like “uniforms and newly painted trucks are not procompetitive.” 281 Precedent
offered the court no guidance as to whether those were, in fact, a valid type of effect.
As a result, the court was left to observe (citing no authority) that “given a choice
people buy a clean or smartly dressed or groomed product ahead of one that presents
a dirty or disheveled appearance.”282 While that observation may generally be
accurate, it was a non sequitur: it did not explain why the unrestrained market would
have failed to optimize product quality or how the restraint could have alleviated
such a failure. Nonetheless, the justification was held to be valid.283 Such unfocused

ET AL.,

supra note 7, § 5.3f, at 223 (associating Professional Engineers with the proposition
that “public health and welfare cannot be counted as independent benefit categories.”). Later
in the same article, Meese urges a reading that aligns with the present one: “[W]hen read
properly, Professional Engineers allows defendants to escape per se condemnation by
adducing a plausible argument that, absent the restriction, one or more departures from the
assumptions of perfect competition would lead unbridled rivalry to produce a market failure.”
Meese, supra note 145, at 1790–91.
273. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 891–92 (2007).
274. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
275. Id. at 1023.
276. Id. (“[M]ere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a defense under the
antitrust laws.”).
277. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp., No. 84-884, 1984 WL 21973, at *10 (D.D.C.
Aug. 2, 1984).
278. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 20, 21, 80, 97, 123, 134 (1996).
279. New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
280. Id. at 876.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 877.
283. Id. The court need not have reached this result, since it also found that the defendant
lacked market power. See Carrier, supra note 4, at 1276.
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“analysis” speaks for itself. An antitrust enterprise concerned with minimizing error
costs cannot use the type-of-effect approach as the linchpin of justification analysis.
C. The Market-Failure Approach Minimizes Errors
The market-failure approach offers consequentialist advantages over alternative
approaches. The modern antitrust enterprise generally seeks to minimize error
costs.284 The market-failure-based approach is best suited to do so. It is more likely
to avoid false positives than the competitive-process approach, and more likely to
prevent false negatives than the type-of-effect approach.
As to the former, one need look no further than the Supreme Court’s Modern Era
jurisprudence to find the market-failure approach being used to correctly reject
challenges to beneficial restraints. A competitive-process analysis may well have
condemned the joint license in BMI, for example—which, after all, involved
horizontal price fixing. But, assuming that the goal of antitrust is to promote
consumer welfare, such a decision would have constituted an obvious false positive.
The BMI Court’s market-failure approach avoided that undesirable outcome.
As to the latter, consider SCFC ILC. That court could have avoided its erroneous
decision by employing the more rigorous market-failure approach. “Free riding”
occurs due to a particular type of market failure: the presence of positive
externalities.285 With that in mind, the court first should have pointedly asked
whether Visa’s business model created positive externalities upon which Sears could
have taken a free ride. Since that was not the case, the inquiry could (and should)
have ended at this point.286
The Anheuser-Busch court’s analysis could similarly have been improved had it
used the market-failure approach. There, wholesalers allegedly needed exclusive
territories to prevent rivals from free riding on their investments in various
“cosmetics.”287 But do wholesalers’ investments in fresh paint for their delivery
trucks create any positive externalities upon which rivals could take a free ride? Of
course not. By the time a delivery truck arrives, the purchasing decision has already
been made. Unlike, for example, a storefront retailer’s investment in a
knowledgeable sales staff, fresh paint for delivery trucks does not create

284. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 24. For a trenchant critique of error-cost
analysis as currently employed by the antitrust orthodoxy, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the
Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J.
1 (2015).
285. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY:
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsand
Externalities.html [https://perma.cc/DXE3-P9Y5] (“[T]he free-rider problem and positive
externalities are two sides of the same coin.”).
286. Some courts and scholars suggest that free riding on point-of-sale services occurs
rarely in practice. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1576
(11th Cir. 1983); William S. Stewart & Barry S. Roberts, Viability of the Antitrust Per Se
Illegality Rule: Schwinn Down, How Many to Go?, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 727, 756 (1980)
(“Frequently point-of-sale services are unnecessary and the ‘free-rider’ problem does not
actually exist.”).
287. New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 855–56 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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externalities. There was no free ride to be had. By prompting such questions, the
market-failure approach could have prevented the Anheuser-Busch court from
crediting a sham justification.
U.S. judges, as core institutional members of a deep-seated liberal tradition, tend
naturally to be skeptical of claims that markets do not work.288 Perhaps this tendency
helps to explain why modern plaintiffs almost never win rule-of-reason cases.289
Antitrust plaintiffs must convince judges that the (restrained) market is not working
very well. Often overlooked is the fact that antitrust defendants make a similar
claim—one that should invite similar skepticism. An antitrust defendant that proffers
a procompetitive justification is, in effect, arguing that the unrestrained market was
not working very well. The market-failure approach is likely to prompt more
searching judicial analyses of alleged procompetitive justifications.
The market-failure approach also offers greater clarity to those seeking to
understand antitrust doctrine. The type-of-effect framework leads to cases like
Professional Engineers being treated as a doctrinal “conundrum.” 290 But the proper
question is not whether “higher quality” is procompetitive or anticompetitive. That
inquiry leads nowhere; authority can be found to support either proposition. Instead,
the proper question is whether the challenged restraint alleviated a market failure.
Finally, the market-failure approach refocuses antitrust on its raison d’être. The
type-of-effect approach was born out of—and has materially contributed to—an
unhealthy obsession with output. 291 While output effects can be a useful diagnostic
tool, they are not, nor should they be, the entirety of antitrust analysis. Sometimes
higher output is good. But not always. Externalizing costs, 292 overconsumption,293
deception,294 coercion295—all can increase output, yet harm consumers and society.
Restraints that prevent such conduct may decrease output, yet leave the world a better
place. It is high time for the antitrust enterprise to recognize the shortcomings of
focusing exclusively on output.

288. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696,
1701 (1986) (advocating an antitrust program that is “profoundly . . . skeptical of the ability
of courts to make things better even with the best data”).
289. See Carrier, supra note 42, at 830 (observing that, during the decade stretching from
1999 to 2009, defendants won 221 of 222 rule-of-reason cases, a 99.5% win rate).
290. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.3f, at 223.
291. Bork, supra note 79, at 122 (“The task of antitrust is to identify and prohibit those
forms of behavior whose net effect is output restricting and hence detrimental.”); cf. Barak Y.
Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 153
(2010) (“[A]ntitrust laws appear to welcome low prices regardless of the actual impact on
consumer welfare.”).
292. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 646 (7th
ed. 2009) (“When firms do not take into account the harms associated with negative
externalities, the result is excess production and unnecessary social costs.”).
293. See e.g., John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 1446
(2013) (discussing overconsumption and hoarding behaviors in the context of “free” digitalmedia products).
294. Patterson, supra note 121.
295. Id.
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IV. ANALYZING PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
As we have seen, the market-failure approach offers superior flexibility and
accuracy. But, while market failure has become the touchstone for modern
procompetitive-justification analysis, there remains considerable room for
improvement. Properly applying the market-failure approach requires a clear
analytical framework.296 The following discussion explains how best to assess
procompetitive justifications.
A. The Three-Step Framework
It is not enough to ask whether the defendant has offered some justification for its
conduct. It is not enough to ask whether the challenged restraint increased or
decreased output. And it is not enough to ask whether the defendant has paid lip
service to some common cause of market failure (free riding, for example). These
questions are either too unfocused or overly simplistic. Instead, when conducted
properly, procompetitive justification analysis entails three steps.
First, the defendant must identify a specific cause of market failure. To be a valid
starting point, the identified market failure must be well-recognized and wellaccepted. This is a question of antitrust law and economics. If the defendant’s
proffered justification amounts to nothing more than a claim that its product is not
competitive, the analysis can end. The “justification” is baseless: producing
unattractive products is not a textbook source of market failure. To the contrary, a
restraint that props up demand for such a product reduces welfare.297 If, instead, the
defendant identifies high transaction costs, free-rider problems, downstream market
power, information asymmetries, or another well-established cause of market failure,
analysis should proceed to the next step.
Second, the defendant must prove that the relevant market actually failed (or
would have failed)298 absent the challenged restraint. This is a purely factual
question. A defendant cannot simply claim, without more, that the market was
subject to “some” failure. Specificity is required. A vague claim of “transaction
costs” alone, for example, is not enough. Cases like BMI are illustrative: the
defendant did not merely claim a “market failure” or even “transaction costs.”
Instead, it demonstrated that the vast number of sellers and buyers in the relevant
market meant that the costs of transacting were prohibitively high relative to the
value of the rights at issue. 299 Similarly, vague claims of “free riding” alone are not

296. The following assumes that the analyst has already assessed whether the defendant’s
proffered justification has nothing to do with consumer welfare. If so, rule-of-reason analysis
may be inappropriate: the challenged conduct may be noncommercial and therefore outside
the scope of the antitrust laws.
297. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115–16 (1984) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that restricting output of televised games was necessary to ensure live attendance).
298. Cf. Brief of Respondent at 26, FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)
(No. 84-1809) (“Hopefully, a body count will not be required before health care concerns are
considered in a proper rule of reason analysis.”).
299. Brief for Petitioners at 23, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nos.
77-1578, 77-1583) (“[T]he transaction costs in obtaining rights to individual songs are
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sufficient. The defendant must prove that its business model produced some positive
externality, and that its rivals were able to take a free ride on that externality.
Testimony from marketplace participants can shed light on this question, as can
econometric evidence. Evidence of the defendant’s rationale for adopting the
restraint will also be probative.300
Third, the defendant must prove that the challenged restraint actually alleviated
the market failure. This, too, is a factual question. Of course, the defendant need not
show that the restraint entirely cured the relevant market failure. But some showing
of alleviation is required. Here again, evidence of the defendant’s rationale for
imposing the restraint will be probative, though the ultimate question is one of effect,
not intent.301
As we have seen, restraints of trade that decrease output of the relevant product
can be welfare enhancing.302 But alleged procompetitive justifications that involve
output reductions are particularly suspect: the defendant is alleging that it behaved
against its own selfish interest. That said, such justifications are more likely (though
certainly not always)303 valid where the defendant is a nonprofit entity304 or the
defendants comprise a majority of nonprofit entities. 305
In sum, and with these principles in mind, the proper procompetitive-justification
inquiry is structured as follows:
1. First, the defendant must identify a specific, well-established cause of market
failure.
2. Second, the defendant must prove that the relevant market actually failed (or
would have failed) absent the challenged restraint.
3. Third, the defendant must prove that the challenged restraint actually alleviated
the market failure.

prohibitively high in relation to the value of the rights.”).
300. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 160–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),
rev’d on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
301. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1506.
302. See supra notes 253–61 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., United States v. N.D. Hosp. Ass’n., 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986)
(striking down a horizontal agreement among nonprofit, charitable institutions).
304. As to nonprofits, the general consensus view appears to echo Judge Posner’s
observation in Hospital Corporation of America v. FTC: “The adoption of the nonprofit form
does not change human nature . . . .” 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming the FTC’s
decision to block a hospital merger). Such institutions are still, by and large, presumed to be
rational and profit-maximizing. Cf. id. at 1390–91; N.D. Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028
(striking down a horizontal agreement among nonprofit, charitable institutions). But see FTC
v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296–97 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (relying, in the
context of an FTC challenge to a proposed hospital merger, on the nonprofit status—and
attendant nonstandard incentives—of both merging parties to conclude that harm to
competition was unlikely).
305. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (holding that a
state licensing board comprising a majority of active market participants did not receive state
action immunity from antitrust liability).
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This systematic framework facilitates accurate analysis, thereby minimizing error
costs. It also increases the transparency and clarity of judicial decision-making. As
the leading treatise notes, these are particularly important and noble goals in antitrust
law, largely a common law discipline.306
B. Case Comparison: Increasing Rigor, Improving Outcomes
To illustrate how the three-step market-failure approach can facilitate decisionmaking in practice, consider a pair of antitrust cases, both involving credit card
network markets. The first is SCFC ILC, which relied on the simplistic type-of-effect
approach and reached an erroneous decision. The second is the district court’s
opinion in American Express, which employed the market-failure approach to
correctly assess two proffered justifications.
In SCFC ILC, as we have seen, the Tenth Circuit wrongly credited a defendant’s
sham “free rider” justification. The resulting false positive proved costly: it required
DOJ to relitigate essentially the same case a few years later in order to correct the
error, necessitating a substantial outlay of societal resources. 307 Consumer welfare
suffered in the interim. All of this could have been avoided had the Tenth Circuit
correctly employed the three-step approach. The analysis could have ended at the
second step: the relevant market did not actually exhibit the alleged failure.
Compare that with the Eastern District of New York’s decision in American
Express. There, the district court was presented with two proffered justifications. 308
Neither was, on its face, an obvious candidate for rejection—but both were, in fact,
baseless. Employing a rigorous market-failure approach, the district court reached
the correct decision on both counts.
At issue were a credit card network’s contractual restraints that prevented
merchant customers from, among other things, communicating truthful pricing
information to their clientele. 309 American Express’s first justification was that its
restraints were necessary to preserve its “differentiated” business model, which
depended on extracting high fees from its merchant customers. 310 The court
described at length American Express’s various complex arguments in favor of this
justification, noting that they were “intuitively appealing.”311 But, as the court

306. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 1500 (“By exposing their reasoning,
judges and commentators are subjected to others’ critical analyses, which in turn can lead to
better understanding for the future.”).
307. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
308. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d on other
grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
309. Id. at 165.
310. Id. at 225. The relevant market(s), however defined, in which credit card networks
operate appear to be less than perfectly competitive by a wide margin. See, e.g., Rory Van
Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232,
245−46 (2018) (drawing on natural experiments to argue that credit card markets exhibit
“insufficient competition”).
311. American Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 227.
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pointed out, “assuming American Express actually offers premium value to its
merchants, the market will tolerate . . . a premium price for its network services.” 312
In short, American Express simply failed to identify a market failure. Its
arguments, stripped down to their essence, were similar to the argument in NCAA v.
Board of Regents that restricting output of televised games was necessary to protect
live attendance.313 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, defendants cannot escape
liability by arguing that their products are “insufficiently attractive to consumers”
and need to be insulated from competition. 314 Unattractive products going unsold is
not a valid reason to restrain a market. In fact, a restraint that artificially props up
demand for an unattractive product by stifling the flow of truthful information is
anticompetitive, not procompetitive—it causes a market failure.315 American
Express was essentially arguing the Government’s case rather than its own. Because
American Express failed even to identify a relevant market failure, the court’s
analysis of the first justification correctly ended at this point. 316
As its second justification, American Express (like many antitrust defendants)
claimed its restraints were necessary to prevent free riding.317 The court’s analysis
again began with step one: identifying the particular alleged cause of market failure.
This time, the cause was valid. As the court explained, free riding can cause market
failure “even in purely competitive markets.” 318 Thus, the court proceeded to step
two.
At step two, the court assessed whether the relevant market was, in fact, subject
to such a failure. Free-rider problems occur only where a particular business model
or strategy creates some positive externality that can be captured by a third party.
Thus, the court analyzed whether American Express’s business strategy actually
created some positive externality that merchants could have taken advantage of
without paying. American Express claimed to be concerned about merchants free
riding on its “useful advertising products” and “other market intelligence
products.”319 But because American Express could have—and sometimes did
—charge merchants for these services, there was no externality.320 Where the ride is
not free, there is no free-rider market failure. As a result, the district court correctly
rejected the second proffered justification. 321

312. Id. at 233.
313. Id. at 228 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents., 468 U.S. 85, 116–17 (1984)).
314. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 87, 117 (“[P]etitioner forwards a justification that is inconsistent
with the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”).
315. In particular, the allocative inefficiency of such an arrangement is readily apparent,
though a reduction of dynamic efficiency is also possible, perhaps likely.
316. American Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 231−32.
317. Id. at 225.
318. Id. at 234.
319. Id. at 235.
320. Id. at 236 (“Where, as here, payment is possible, free-riding is not a problem because
the ride is not free.” (quoting Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
321. Id. at 235–36. In an unfortunate coda, the U.S. Supreme Court made a hash of things
on appeal. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Justice Thomas, writing for a
slim majority comprising the Court’s more conservative wing, advanced the claim that
American Express’s contractual restraints “actually stem negative externalities.” Id. at 2289.
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The structured, three-step framework for analyzing justifications can greatly
improve antitrust analysis. It offers clear guidance, increases rigor, and improves
accuracy. Employed properly, it streamlines litigation, saving plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ time and money. By avoiding the need to re-litigate erroneously decided
cases, it also conserves judicial and societal resources.
CONCLUSION
Understanding procompetitive justifications is a vital task for a modern antitrust
enterprise dominated by the rule of reason. The flexibility offered by the modern rule
of reason is generally viewed as beneficial. But flexibility without guidance is chaos.
Forty years of confusion is long enough. The task at hand is urgent; the way forward
is clear. By injecting much-needed rigor and coherence, the market-failure
framework represents a vast improvement in antitrust decision-making.

According to Thomas, a merchant’s encouraging customers to use a lower-cost form of
payment would cause them to be less likely to use American Express cards at other merchants.
Id. But an “externality” is some effect of production or consumption activity that is not directly
reflected in the market. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 292, at 645. Even in Thomas’s
rather far-fetched version of events, no negative costs escape the market; there is no
externality. Instead of alleviating a market failure, the restraints (as noted above) actually
caused one. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.

